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L Introduction
With the growth of tribal' gaming on Native American reservations, the
potential for lawsuits between tribal members and non-Indians increases
dramatically.2 Even if the tribes do not operate a casino, the increasing mobility of
American culture provides more opportunities for interactions between tribal
members and non-Indians. Whether a breach of a construction contract,3 an alleged
assault,4 or a simple traffic accident in Indian country, 5 the opposing parties must
have a judicial forum available to resolve the dispute.
While litigants often have three available judicial forums from which to
choose, tribal courts receive much less respect than corresponding state and federal
courts. 6 In an attempt to level the playing field, modem congressional policies
attempt to promote tribal governments and court systems Unfortunately, the law
concerning the extent of tribal court jurisdiction remains vastly unsettled. In fact,
1. I use the terms "tribe" and "Indian" as terms of art throughout this Note. These terms
are used extensively in Supreme Court cases, congressional statutes, and scholarly works on this
subject.
2. See, e.g., Jim Avila et al., Jackpot or Mistake? Man Sues Over $1. 6M "Jackpot,"
ABC News, Oct. 25, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?.id=3772215 (last visited Feb.
20, 2008) (describing a suit by a non-Indian who allegedly did not receive his casino winnings)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See generally Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
5. See generally Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
6. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L.
REV. 225, 237-44 (1994) (discussing the lack of legitimacy of tribal courts).
7. See infra Part II (discussing the development of modern Indian policy).
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non-Indians challenge the exercise of tribal courtjurisdiction so frequently that the
Supreme Court had to develop a procedural mechanism to prevent non-Indians
from completely avoiding the available tribal court systems.8
Despite federal efforts to promote tribal sovereignty through the increased
use of tribal courts, Congress has taken few steps to establish a coherent role
for the tribal courts within the federal system.9 With little guidance from
Congress, the Supreme Court has asserted its role in the development of Indian
policy, much to the regret of tribal advocates.' By drastically limiting the
extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Supreme Court has
delivered devastating blows to tribal sovereignty."
Because the current system is highly complex and deeply flawed,'
2
Congress needs to assert itself by enacting a statute that comprehensively
defines the extent of tribal court jurisdiction. In addition, Congress must define
the role of the tribal courts within the federal system.' 3 The easiest way for
Congress to achieve both of those objectives would be to classify the Indian
tribes as some other political entity that already has a set place in the federal
system. ' 4 Indian tribes, however, are not all the same,' 5 and a classification that
works for one tribe may not work for others. This Note proposes a more
flexible solution that attempts to balance tribal sovereignty with the
constitutional rights of non-Indians.'
6
Part II of this Note discusses the federal government's changing policies
toward Indian tribes and the effect of those policies on tribal sovereignty. Part
III discusses the current state of tribal court jurisdiction, as developed by the
Supreme Court. Part IV uncovers problems with the current system and
8. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the exhaustion doctrine).
9. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (detailing Congress's deference to the
Supreme Court in Indian affairs).
10. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities
and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REv. 313, 327-29 (1997)
(describing the development of a second strand of plenary power doctrine).
11. See Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis
Developing in Indian Law?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 284 (2003) (describing judicial plenary
power as "a rogue doctrine used to curb tribal sovereignty").
12. See infra Part IV (describing several problems with the modem system of tribal
jurisdiction).
13. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the relationships between tribal courts and state and
federal courts).
14. See infra Part V (discussing the benefits and disadvantages to such classifications).
15. Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside
Indian Country, 6 NEv. L.J. 89, 89 (2005).
16. See infra note 242 and accompanying text (setting forth the four goals of the
proposal).
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discusses the need for Congress to address those problems legislatively. Part V
examines potential legislative solutions that would be easy to implement but
that do not address the problem filly. Finally, Part VI offers a more
comprehensive solution that attempts to address the needs and concerns of both
the tribes and the United States.
II. Tribal Sovereignty and the Development of Modern Indian Policy
In United States v. Kagama,'7 the Supreme Court established that the
federal government has plenary power to control the Indian tribes.' 8 Congress
alone possesses that power.19 Although the plenary power doctrine is widely
criticized for its questionable constitutionality,20 Congress has continually relied
on this power to regulate Indian affairs.
Unfortunately, congressional policy on Indian affairs has been highly
inconsistent. The year after Kagama, Congress began the "assimilation period"
by passing the General Allotment Act of 1887.21 By allowing the distribution
of tribal lands to individual tribal members, Congress provided a way to expose
Indians to the American way of life.22 The General Allotment Act had the
17. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886) (holding that the federal
government has plenary power over the Indian tribes). In Kagama, the Supreme Court
considered the validity of Section 9 of the Indian Appropriation Act of 1885. Id. at 376. After
separating the act into its two components, the Court discussed the constitutional foundation for
the passage of the act. Id. at 377-79. Next, the Court determined that the United States owned
the land, subject to the possession of the Indians. Id. at 381-82. Then, the Court determined
that its decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), caused Congress to pass the
challenged act in response to the decision. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383. Finally, the Court found
that because the Indian tribes were dependent upon the federal government, not the states, for
their protection, daily food, and political rights, the federal government had plenary power over
the Indian tribes. Id. at 383-84. The Court reasoned that plenary power must exist in the federal
government for four reasons: (1) "it never has existed anywhere else," (2) "the theatre of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States," (3) that power had never been
denied, and (4) the federal government "alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes." Id. at 384-
85.
18. Id. at 383-84.
19. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department
of the government.").
20. See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 271-72 n.4 (listing numerous scholarship
on the topic).
21. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (providing citizenship for
Indians who adopt a "civilized" life).
22. See id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389 (providing for allotment of tribal lands to individual
Indians, who could alienate the land in fee to non-Indians after 25 years). For a great discussion
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devastating effect of dividing tribal land into a patchwork of ownership by
allowing the distribution of previously community-held tribal lands to
individual Indians who later sold the land to non-Indians.23 At the same time,
Supreme Court opinions concerning tribal sovereignty split into two lines of
authority, one affirming tribal sovereignty and the other drastically reducing
it.
24
Realizing the General Allotment Act's failure, Congress later repealed it,
and now the United States owns all non-allotted tribal lands in trust for the
tribes. 25 Beginning in 1934, congressional policy moved toward an approach
that focused more on tribal self-governance and independence.26 Since that
time, Congress has recognized that "Indian tribes possess the inherent authority
to establish their own form of government, including tribal justice systems."
27
To accomplish that goal, Congress has provided funding for the growth of tribal
court systems every year since 1993.28 Even the Executive Branch has
announced a set of goals for all executive departments and agencies to follow
that "reflect[] respect for the rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal
of the legislative history behind the act, see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9
(1981).
23. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, § 5, 24 Stat. at 388-89 (providing for allotment of tribal
lands to individual Indians, who could alienate the land to non-Indians in fee after 25 years).
24. See Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 335-36 (1989) (noting contradictory decisions from this
period).
25. SeeAct of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-2,48 Stat. 984, 984 ("[H]ereafter, no land of
any Indian reservation... shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian. The existing periods of
trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation thereof are hereby extended
and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.").
26. Seeid. §§ 1-2,9-11, 16,48 Stat. at 984, 986-87 (providing several major reversals of
former policy including ending the allotment process, vesting title in the United States in trust
for the Indian tribes, providing funding for Indian education and corporations, and providing a
procedure for Tribes to create their own constitutions that vest certain powers in the tribe).
27. Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 2(4), 107 Stat. 2004, 2004 (1993)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4) (2000)).
28. See id. §201, 107 Stat. at 2009 (setting forth the appropriations for base support
funding and administrative expense funding for each year from 1994 through 2000); Indian
Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, § 202, 114
Stat. 2778, 2781-82 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3621 (2000)) (extending the annual
funding provisions of the Indian Tribal Justice Act through 2007).
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governments." 29 Before 1978, decisions of the Supreme Court also recognized
the broad inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes.30
Even without strong constitutional support, federal courts "routinely and
uniformly" accept that Congress maintains plenary power over the Indian
tribes. 31 Fortunately, modem federal policy is much more supportive of tribal
governments than in the past. The Supreme Court, however, has nullified the
effect of that policy by sharply limiting tribal court jurisdiction.
III. Tribal Court Jurisdiction Under Supreme Court Precedent
Despite Congress's well-established plenary power over Indian affairs, the
Supreme Court has developed most of the existing law concerning tribal court
jurisdiction. Because Congress has done little to disrupt these decisions, the
Supreme Court has almost single-handedly created the modem framework for
tribal court jurisdiction, while simultaneously limiting tribal sovereignty. 32 In
fact, at least one commentator has noted that the Supreme Court has adopted its
own brand of plenary power, which is still inferior to the congressional plenary
power. 33 Instead of following the familiar state-court judicial model, the
existing framework determines tribal court jurisdiction depending on which
classification the parties fall under: "non-Indian, Indian nonmember, and
member. 34 While party status remains important in the context of tribal court
civil jurisdiction, it normally is a determinative factor for purposes of tribal
court criminal jurisdiction.
29. Memorandum of April 29, 1994 on Government-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,951 (May 4, 1994); see also
Policy on Indian Sovereignty, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,424, 29,425 (June 10, 1996) (laying out the three
basic principles of Indian affairs).
30. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (affirming the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tribal court over a tribal adoption proceeding); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959) ("[A]bsent governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them."). But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) ("By
submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable
to Congress.").
31. Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 279.
32. See id. at 284 (describing judicial plenary power as "a rogue doctrine used to curb
tribal sovereignty").
33. See Ponmersheim, supra note 10, at 327-29 (1997) (describing the development of a
second strand of plenary power doctrine).
34. David A. Castleman, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L.
REv. 1253, 1259 (2006).
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A. Modern Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
As noted above, the extent of tribal court criminal jurisdiction varies
greatly depending on the classification of the parties. In fact, tribal courts
currently have no jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians. Even
worse, specific statutes prevent tribal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
some tribal members. This subpart discusses the effect of party status on tribal
court criminal jurisdiction more fully below. In addition, this subpart describes
the effect of tribal prosecutions on the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.
1. The Determinative Power of Party Status
Generally, "It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to enforce their
criminal laws against tribe members. '3 5  Specific language in the Indian
Country Crimes Act supports that very broad Supreme Court proposition.
3 6
Despite the general rule, two major pieces of legislation sharply limit the extent
of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. First, the Major
Crimes Act provides a specified list of crimes over which the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction.37 Second, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA)
limits tribal court sentencing power to a maximum of one year in jail plus a
$5,000 fine.38 By placing extreme limits on the methods of punishment,
Congress has effectively narrowed tribal court criminal jurisdiction over
member Indians to crimes that constitute misdemeanors. Thus, while tribal
court criminal jurisdiction over tribal members remains relatively broad,
statutory limits greatly limit the effectiveness of law enforcement on the
reservation.39
35. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) ("This section shall not extend to offenses committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian .... ").
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 ("Any Indian who commits against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses.., shall be subject to the same law
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."). Congress passed this act in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883), which found that a federal district
court did not have jurisdiction over the Indian defendant who murdered another Indian.
38. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 73, 77, amended by Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207, 3353 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000)).
39. See infra Part IV.B (discussing problems with the current system of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction).
IN A CLASS BY THEMSEL VES
Unlike the exercise of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over member
Indians, the question of whether tribal courts may exercise criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians is more controversial. In fact, jurisdiction over this
class of people represents the one area that Congress has disagreed with the
Supreme Court's tribal court jurisprudence.4 ° Specifically, Congress imposed
its will on the Supreme Court by allowing tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians in criminal cases. 41 That statute equates tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians with its criminal jurisdiction over
tribal members.
Despite the congressional action granting tribal court criminal jurisdiction
over both member and nonmember Indians, Congress has yielded to the
Supreme Court concerning tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,42 the Supreme Court firmly established
that "Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-
Indians., 43 While Congress is free to pass legislation providing tribal courts
with criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 44 it has yet to do so. More
importantly, Congress's failure to respond, combined with its actions
concerning the other classifications, indicates that it is satisfied with the
Supreme Court's conclusion.
40. Compare Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,696 (1990) (determining that tribal courts do
not have jurisdiction over nonmember Indians), with 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (giving tribal
governments criminal jurisdiction over all Indians).
41. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892
(amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) to reflect its current language). This Act is known as the
"Duro-fix" because Congress passed it to specifically overrule the Supreme Court's holding in
Duro.
42. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that
"Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians"). In Oliphant,
the petitioners were non-Indian residents of the Port Madison Reservation charged with various
violations of the tribal code. Id. at 194. Oliphant challenged the tribal court's exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over him as a non-Indian. Id. The Court reviewed various treaty
provisions with other Indian tribes and concluded that "it was apparently assumed that the tribes
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty
provision to that effect." Id. at 197. Next, the Court discussed a district court opinion that held
that "to give an Indian tribal court 'jurisdiction of the person of an offender, such offender must
be an Indian."' Id. at 200 (quoting Exparte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (W.D. Ark. 1878)
(No. 7720)). Finally, the Court noted that because the Indian tribes submitted to the power of
the United States, they gave up their power to try non-Indians except in a manner provided by
Congress. Id. at 210.
43. Id. at212.
44. Id.
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2. Double Jeopardy
With the potential for federal court jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act, double jeopardy problems may exist when a prosecution of an Indian in
federal court follows a tribal court prosecution for a similar offense or, more
often, a lesser-included one. For example, a tribal court conviction for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor could precede a federal prosecution
for statutory rape arising out of the same incident.45 Under the Dual Sovereign
exception to double jeopardy, a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent
state prosecution for the same acts, nor does a state prosecution bar a
subsequent federal prosecution.46 On the other hand, successive prosecutions
in federal and territorial courts are not subject to the Dual Sovereign exception
because the territorial courts get their power directly from the federal
government.47 Because tribal governments derive some of their power from the
federal government, while retaining other inherent powers, the "controlling
question... is the source of this power to punish tribal offenders: Is it a part of
inherent tribal sovereignty, or an aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal
Government which has been delegated to the tribes by Congress?,
48
Fortunately, the Supreme Court answered that question in United States v.
Wheeler.49 After deciding that Congress had specifically chosen not to deprive
Indian tribes of "their sovereign power to punish offenses against tribal law by
members of a tribe,"50 the Court ruled that trying Wheeler in federal court after
his tribal court conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.5' Later,
45. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 315 (1978) (establishing this fact
pattern).
46. See generally Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
47. See Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264-66 (1937) ("[Such courts] are
creations emanating from the same sovereignty.").
48. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322.
49. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) (holding that the dual
sovereignty exception "applies to successive tribal and federal prosecutions"). In Wheeler, the
Court was faced with the question of whether a defendant, who pleaded guilty in tribal court,
subsequently could be prosecuted in federal court for a similar offense. Id. at 315-16. After
discussing precedent on the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy, the Court had to
determine the source of the power to punish tribal offenders. Id. at 317-22. Next, the Court
determined that Indian tribes still possess the sovereign power to punish tribal members who
violate tribal law because Congress had not specifically withdrawn that power. Id. at 323-328.
Thus, the federal courts could punish Wheeler under the dual sovereignty exception to double
jeopardy. Id. at 329-30.
50. Id. at 325.
51. Id. at 332.
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the Supreme Court extended this holding to situations involving nonmembers
who were subjected to the tribal court's jurisdiction under the Duro-fix.
52
B. Civil Jurisdiction
While congressional statutes and Oliphant clearly establish the extent of
tribal criminal jurisdiction, tribal civil jurisdiction is much more complicated.
Because of the lack of statutes in this area, the Supreme Court has been
extremely active in laying out the boundaries of tribal court civil jurisdiction.
The Court's precedent establishes that a tribal court's civil jurisdiction is
somewhat broader than its corresponding criminal jurisdiction.53 In addition to
party status, the status of the land on which the event occurs affects the
determination of whether the tribal court can exercise jurisdiction.
1. Party Status
Clearly, Indian tribes have civil jurisdiction over disputes involving only
their members.54 Civil jurisdiction over disputes between tribal members and
nonmembers, however, faces substantial limitations.55 Nonmembers are treated
the same as non-Indians for civil jurisdiction purposes because of "an
overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be 'protected...
from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.' 56 For the purposes of
52. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (holding that the Duro-fix was
not a delegation of federal power, but rather amounted to an exercise of inherent tribal authority
which Congress was authorized to permit to the tribes). For the derivation of the name "Duro-
fix," see supra note 41.
53. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) ("Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.").
54. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 ("[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders,
the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members."
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978))).
55. See id. at 565 (establishing a general proposition that tribal power does not extend to
nonmembers).
56. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)); id. at 377 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring)
("[T]he relevant distinction ... is between members and nonmembers of the tribe."); see also 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (defining "powers of self-government to include "the inherent power of
Indian tribes... to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians" (emphasis added)).
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civil jurisdiction, Montana v. United States57 "is the pathmarking case
concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.
5 8
Although Montana dealt only with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Indian
tribe, the Supreme Court later held that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does
not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. "59 In other words, a tribe has civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers only if it can apply its laws to them. Thus, if the
tribe has regulatory authority over a nonmember, it presumptively has civil
jurisdiction in its courts.60 In practice, however, a tribal court does not have
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers unless it can acquire jurisdiction under one
or both of the Montana exceptions.
6'
The first Montana exception allows the tribe to "regulate... the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements., 62 This exception allows an Indian tribe to impose regulatory
taxes on nonmembers, at least when the transaction occurs on trust land.63
57. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1981) (holding that "title to the
bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of Montana upon its admission into the Union").
In Montana, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the Crow Tribe could regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian lands within the reservation. Id. at 547.
First, the Court had to determine whether the United States retained title to the land or passed
the title to the State upon its admission to the Union. Id. at 551. After recognizing the strong
presumption against conveyance by the United States, the Court concluded that the title to the
Big Horn River passed to the State when it entered the Union. Id. at 552-57. Next, the Court
overruled the Court of Appeals by failing to find that the right to restrict hunting and fishing by
nonmembers did not flow from treaties between the tribe and the United States. Id. at 557-59.
The Court again overruled the appellate court by determining that 18 U.S.C. § 1165 did not
augment the tribes regulatory powers. Id. at 561-563. Finally, the Court held that generally,
"the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe." Id. at 565. The Court also established two exceptions to the general rule: (1) the
tribe may regulate "the activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with
the tribe," and (2) the tribe can "exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 555-56.
The regulatory power at issue in the case did not meet either exception, so the exercise of that
authority by the tribe was invalid. Id. at 566.
58. Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
59. Id. at 453.
60. See id. ("[W]here tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers,
'[c]ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts."' (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987))).
61. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (establishing two exceptions to the general rule
preventing the tribe from regulating the activities of nonmembers).
62. Id. at 565 (citations omitted).
63. Compare Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)
(establishing that the tribe has taxing authority over tribal lands leased by nonmembers), with
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently held that "a
nonmember who knowingly enters tribal courts for the purpose of filing suit
against a tribal member has ... entered into a 'consensual relationship' with the
tribe within the meaning of Montana. "64
The second Montana exception allows the tribe to regulate conduct of
nonmembers that "has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. "65 Later, the Supreme Court
provided some additional guidance as to what this exception does not cover.
For example, a nonmember driving recklessly on a public highway running
through a reservation is not enough to trigger this exception.66 Rather, the
tribal court jurisdiction must be "needed to preserve 'the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. ,,67 Additionally, Indian
tribes do not have authority to regulate state officers who are executing process
related to a violation of state law off the reservation.68
2. Land Status
Until this decade, the type of land on which the event in question occurred
was a dispositive factor in determining if a tribe could exercise civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers.69 In fact, Montana's second exception specifically
authorizes tribal court jurisdiction over "the conduct of non-Indians on fee
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,659 (2001) ("The Navajo Nation's imposition of
a tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation is... presumptively
invalid."). For more information on the role of land classification in determining civil
jurisdiction, see infra Part III.B.2.
64. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The
dissent notes that the Supreme Court determined that allowing nonmembers access to tribal
courts does not fall within the second Montana exception. Id. at 1143 (Gould, J., dissenting)
(citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)).
65. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
66. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,457-58 (1997) ("[I]f Montana's second
exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.").
67. Id. at 459 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
68. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001) ("[T]ribal authority to regulate state
officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not
essential to tribal self-government or internal relations . ..").
69. But see id. at 360 ("The ownership status of the land.., is only one factor to consider
in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 'necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations."' (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 564 (1981))).
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lands within [the] reservation.'70  Many commentators have discussed this
requirement in terms of territorial jurisdiction.7'
Even if the events occur within Indian country,72 another land
classification plays a key role in determining whether the tribal court may
properly exercise jurisdiction. Namely, the court must determine whether the
events took place on trust land or non-Indian fee land. The need to distinguish
between those types of land came about because of the General Allotment Act
of 1887. 73
Although Montana technically applied only to land held as non-Indian fee
lands,74 the Supreme Court struggled with the question of whether the Montana
analysis would also apply to events involving non-Indians on lands held in trust
by the United States.75 In fact, one combined case created a split opinion in the
Supreme Court, in which different combinations of three separate opinions
constituted different majorities in each case, and the key factor was the
ownership status of the land.76 In 2001, however, the Supreme Court
determined that land status was merely a factor in the jurisdictional framework
and that the principles of Montana applied, even on Indian fee lands.77
70. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 24, at 343-44 (discussing the appropriateness of
an inquiry into the territorial jurisdiction of the tribal court); Julia A. Pace, Comment,
Enforcement of Tribal Law in Federal Court: Affirmation of Indian Sovereignty or a Step
Backward Towards Assimilation?, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 435, 438-41 (1992) (explaining how
"[djetermining the geographical boundaries of Indian tribal governments is paramount to
determining the extent of tribal civil jurisdiction").
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) ("'Indian country' ... means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,...
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States. . . , and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.... ").
73. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the problems created by the
General Allotment Act).
74. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981) ("This case concerns the
sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians." (emphasis added)).
75. Compare Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (establishing
that the tribe has taxing authority over tribal lands leased by nonmembers), with Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001) ("The Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax
upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation is... presumptively invalid.");
see also Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997) (agreeing that "tribes retain
considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land").
76. See generally Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
77. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (deciding that the ownership status of
the land is one factor in the Montana analysis). "It may sometimes be a dispositive factor." Id.
(noting that "the absence of tribal ownership has been virtually conclusive of the absence of
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IV. Problems with the Current State of Tribal Jurisdiction
Even if a tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember, state
and federal courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over the case. In those
instances, courts must devise a system to determine which court properly
should hear the case. While state and federal courts have developed choice of
law procedures, as well as numerous other judicial doctrines such as
abstention 78 and the Erie Doctrine,79 no such system exists for relationships
between tribal and state or tribal and federal courts.80
Although the Supreme Court and Congress have addressed some of the
problems of fitting tribal courts into the federalist system, their efforts have
only further complicated those relationships. After discussing the failed
attempts of the Supreme Court and Congress to create a clear relationship
between tribal courts and other forums, this Part discusses key problems with
the present system. Those problems require a congressional solution rather
than a gradual evolution through Supreme Court jurisprudence.8'
A. Issues Unique to Tribal Courts and the Role of Tribal Courts in the
Federalist System
Generally, if state or federal courts exercise jurisdiction over Indians, or
their lands, in a way that interferes with tribal sovereignty and self-government,
82
that jurisdiction must yield to the tribal court's jurisdiction. Of course,
Congress can change the parameters of that general rule at any time using its
plenary power over Indian affairs.83 For example, Congress gave states the
option of expanding their jurisdiction to cover Indian affairs with the passage of
Public Law 280.84 Similarly, the Supreme Court, through judicial
interpretation of federal statutes, can interpret laws to limit or increase the
tribal civil jurisdiction").
78. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
79. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 96 (noting that "the Supreme Court generally presumes
that the selected venue will apply its own law").
81. See infra Parts V-VI (providing several options for Congress to consider).
82. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) (noting that the exercise of
state or federal jurisdiction can impair the authority of tribal courts).
83. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (detailing the development of the
plenary power doctrine).
84. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch 505, 67 Stat. 588.
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jurisdiction of federal and tribal courts. 85 As a result, the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs by creating the
exhaustion doctrine.
86
1. The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts and Public Law 280
During the early years of the United States, state courts could not exercise
jurisdiction over causes of action that arose on the reservation.87 Instead, the
Supreme Court considered congressional plenary power over reservation affairs
to be absolute.88 In fact, federal control over the reservations was so strong that
many new states had to disclaim jurisdiction over events arising in Indian
country as a condition of statehood.89
Despite this history of absolute federal control, state courts eventually
began acquiring some jurisdiction over reservation affairs. For example, the
Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe can bring suit as a plaintiff in state
court.90 Ultimately, the modem approach developed out of a combination of
infringement and preemption type analyses. 9' The Supreme Court announced
the modem approach in Williams v. Lee: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed upon
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
9 2
In other words, state courts can only exercise jurisdiction over reservation
affairs if the assumption of jurisdiction is not preempted by federal law and
does not infringe upon tribal sovereignty.
85. See Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Parameters of
State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. &MARY L. REv. 539, 561 (1997) ("[T] he Court
announced its astonishingly broad definition of federal question jurisdiction in National
Farmers Union [v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)].").
86. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the exhaustion doctrine and its effect on the tribal
court and federal court relationship).
87. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (finding that the laws of
Georgia have no force within the Cherokee reservation).
88. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("[Indian tribes] owe no
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.").
89. See S. REP. No. 83-699 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409,2412 (listing
eight states with enabling acts disclaiming jurisdiction over reservation territory).
90. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 888 (1986) ("[T]ribal
autonomy and self-government are not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its court
to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country.").
91. See William V. Vetter, The Four Decisions in Three Affiliated Tribes and Pre-
Emption by Policy, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 43, 54 (1988) (establishing the "two separate but
related 'tests' against which state law is to be measured").
92. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
IN A CLASS BY THEMSEL VES
Because federal statutes and treaties cover most Indian law, the
preemption analysis usually takes precedence over the infringement analysis.
93
As a result, infringement analysis occurs most often in the second step of
preemption analysis, which examines the governmental interests involved. 94
Unlike the traditional preemption analysis, preemption in the tribal law context
requires the courts to weigh the interests of the tribe against the federal and
state interests involved. 95 Additionally, express preemption is not required;
instead, the need for certainty of federal preemption varies inversely with the
extent of tribal sovereignty at issue.96 Thus, the greater the infringement of
tribal sovereignty by a state court's assumption ofjurisdiction, the more likely
the court will find such jurisdiction preempted by federal law.
Even with the modem approach to determining whether a state court can
exercise jurisdiction over reservation affairs, Public Law 280 exists as an
example of an explicit federal delegation ofjurisdiction to the state courts. As
originally passed, Public Law 280 provided five states with criminal97 and civil
jurisdiction 98 over Indian country within the respective states, with exceptions
for a few specific tribes. 99 Those five states, along with Alaska, became known
as the "mandatory" states. 't In addition to providing the mandatory states with
jurisdiction, Congress also provided a procedure for the other states to assume
jurisdiction over Indian country within their borders.10' The states that assumed
jurisdiction under that provision became known as "optional" states.1
02
93. See Vetter, supra note 91, at 55 ("There are few facets of Indian or state activity where
there is no potentially relevant treaty or statute.").
94. Id.
95. See id. at 61 (discussing the differences between routine preemption analysis and
preemption in the tribal context); see also Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 884 (describing
the Supreme Court's formulation of a "comprehensive pre-emption inquiry in the Indian law
context").
96. See Vetter, supra note 91, at 62 (discussing the theoretical role of tribal sovereignty in
tribal preemption cases).
97. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)).
98. Id. § 4, 67 Stat. at 589 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) (listing the specific Indian country affected in each
state).
100. Vanessa J. Jimdnez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under
Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1657 (1998).
101. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, § 7, 67 Stat. at 590 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321, 1322 (2000)) (authorizing other states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country by
adopting affirmative legislation).
102. Jim~nez & Song, supra note 100, at 1658.
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Congress intended Public Law 280 to provide a better method of law
enforcement on the reservations'0 3 and to reduce its financial burden. 1 4
Nevertheless, Public Law 280 creates additional unintended problems
concerning the role of tribal courts in the federal system. First, the statute
provides a way for state civil law to preempt tribal law, if they directly
conflict.' '5  While the Supremacy Clause provides a basis for federal
preemption, 0 6 no such constitutional provision provides ajustification for state
preemption of tribal law.
Next, the language of Public Law 280 creates significant confusion over
just how much jurisdiction the state is entitled to assume. One could read the
statute to provide the state courts with general jurisdiction over reservation
affairs, which would prevent the tribal courts from ever exercising
jurisdiction. 0 7 That reading, however, is entirely inconsistent with modem
federal policy and a better reading would view the statute as a transfer of partial
federal jurisdiction. 10 8 Assuming Public Law 280's purpose simply was to
transfer some federal jurisdiction to the states, a further problem arises in
determining whether the exhaustion of tribal remedies is required in state courts
as well as federal courts. If the statute transfers partial federal jurisdiction to
103. S. REP. No. 83-699 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409,2411-12 ("[T]he
enforcement of law and order among the Indians in Indian country has been left largely to the
Indian groups themselves. [However,] [i]n many States, tribes are not adequately organized to
perform that function .... ").
104. See Jimrnez & Song, supra note 100, at 1661 (noting the congressional concern over
the federal government's mounting costs in fulfilling its trust responsibility). Apparently,
Congress also had assimilation in mind when it passed Public Law 280. See id. at 1664 ("Public
Law 280 contains a strong assimilationist bent and there may be language in the statute's
legislative history that could support an assimilationist agenda."); see also Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 387-88 (1976) ("Pub.L. 280 was only one of many types of
assimilationist legislation under active consideration in 1953.").
105. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4(c), 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2000)) ("Any tribal ordinance or custom.., adopted by an Indian tribe...
in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any
applicable law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of
action pursuant to this section." (emphasis added)).
106. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution... and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000) (granting the states with jurisdiction over "offenses
committed by or against Indians" in Indian country within the state); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)
(2000) ("Each of the States... shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of
action. .. ."). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (providing explicit exceptions to state jurisdiction);
28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (same).
108. See Jimdnez & Song, supra note 100, at 1667-78 (providing strong support for a
transfer of federal jurisdiction in both the civil and the criminal contexts).
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the states, the doctrines formulated under federal law should transfer to those
states as well. Exhaustion, however, is a matter of comity, and comity is
completely discretionary. 09 Thus, even if the federal courts grant exhaustion as
a matter of comity, state court comity considerations could indicate that
exhaustion is not required.
While the 1968 amendments to Public Law 280110 were much more
favorable to the tribes than the original statute, they also presented many new
problems. First, the tribal consent provision was not retroactive, so any states
that had already assumed jurisdiction maintained that jurisdiction without the
consent of the tribes."' Next, the federal government allowed the states that
had assumed jurisdiction to return part, or all, of that jurisdiction to the United
States.112 Besides contradicting the original Act's purpose of reducing federal
spending, the retrocession provision allowed the states to manipulate the system
by returning "the most costly forms of jurisdiction while retaining those most
offensive to the Indians."' 1 3 Even worse, the amendments failed to provide a
way for the tribes to initiate the retrocession process if they were dissatisfied
with the state's jurisdiction over them. 1 4 By failing to provide the Indians with
a way to initiate the retrocession, Congress ensured the balance of power
remained with the states, despite Congress's efforts to give the tribes a role in
any future assumptions of jurisdiction."'
2. The Exhaustion Doctrine and Its Effect on the
Tribal/Federal Relationship
Prior to 1985, federal courts usually declined to exercise federal
jurisdiction over events involving Indians on the reservation for lack of a
federal question. 16 Instead, "federal courts presumably assumed that the
109. See Raymond L. Niblock, Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity: Developing
Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 219,221(1997) ("A
federal court confronted with comity concerns is not obligated to consider them.").
110. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81.
111. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535, 551 (1975).
112. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, § 403, 82 Stat, at 79 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2000)).
113. Goldberg, supra note 111, at 559.
114. See id. (offering possible reasons why Congress may not have provided a method for
Indians to initiate retrocession).
115. See id. at 562 (noting that modem Indian policy favors giving the tribes more control
over the retrocession process).
116. See, e.g., Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d
1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal question jurisdiction does not exist merely because an
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 283 (2008)
analysis in Williams v. Lee"17 would guide the determination of the proper
forum."1 8 In 1985, however, the Supreme Court established the exhaustion
doctrine, which gave federal courts a significant role in the federal relationship
with the tribal courts." 19
In setting up the exhaustion doctrine, the Supreme Court decided that
whether a tribal court exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction is a federal
question.1 20 Before a federal court can hear a case, however, the challenging
party must exhaust all available remedies in the tribal forum.' 2' Two years
later, the Court extended the exhaustion doctrine to apply in diversity cases as
well.
22
Notably, the exhaustion doctrine does not "deprive the federal courts of
subject-matter jurisdiction.'02 3 Rather, "[e]xhaustion is required as a matter of
comity";124 thus, it is not jurisdictional in nature. By retaining subject matter
jurisdiction, federal courts serve as an appellate court, at least with regard to the
issue of tribal jurisdiction.'2 5 In practice, however, the exhaustion doctrine
functions like the abstention doctrine, mixed with some principles of
administrative law and habeas corpus law.'
26
The Court provided three reasons why comity requires the exhaustion of
tribal remedies. First, and most significantly, congressional policy favors the
Indian tribe is a party or the case involves a contract with an Indian tribe.").
117. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (finding the state court did not have proper
jurisdiction over events arising on the reservation).
118. Reynolds, supra note 85, at 561.
119. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) ("Until
petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the Tribal court system,. . . it
would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief").
120. Id.
121. See id. ("[E]xhaustion is required before such a claim may be entertained by a federal
court .... ).
122. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("Regardless of the basis
for jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to
stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction."' (quoting Nat "l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857)).
123. Id. at 16 n.8.
124. Id.
125. See Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court
Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 241,254 (1998) (noting the possibility of attacking a tribal court
judgment in federal court, even though a similar challenge does not exist for state court
judgments).
126. See Melissa L. Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries Between Federal and
Tribal Courts, 29 AIZ. ST. L.J. 705, 720-22 (1997) (demonstrating the Court's "strange mix of
abstention, administrative law, and habeas corpus").
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development of tribal self-governance. 27 Adherence to that policy means
providing the tribal court with the first opportunity to respond to challenges to
its jurisdiction.12 Second, "allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal
Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is
addressed"129 best serves judicial efficiency. Finally, exhaustion allows tribal
courts to explain their basis for jurisdiction, and other courts can benefit from
their expertise in tribal matters.
1 30
Since creating the exhaustion doctrine, the Supreme Court has provided
little additional guidance on how lower courts should interpret the purposes or
exceptions to the doctrine.13 Instead, the exhaustion requirement created a
host of new issues concerning when and how to apply exhaustion, and the
lower courts have taken their own approaches to those issues. 13 2  More
importantly, after the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, questions remain as to
what level of scrutiny the federal court should apply to the tribal court
decision133 and how extensive that review should be. 134 Any proposed statutory
scheme should address these important issues.
Perhaps the biggest problem with exhaustion, however, is what to do when
a tribal forum, that rightly has jurisdiction, does not exist. 135 An Indian tribe
may not have a tribal court for several reasons. First, the tribe may be unable to
afford the costs of running a court system. 136 Further, the tribe may rely on the
elected tribal council to determine all disputes between tribal members.
37
127. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)




130. Id. at 857.
131. See id. at 857 n.21 (listing exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine); see also Koehn,
supra note 126, at 749-62 (discussing lower court attempts to interpret the three exceptions to
exhaustion).
132. See Koehn, supra note 126, at 728-48 (discussing several key issues that remain
unresolved by the Supreme Court).
133. See Royster, supra note 125, at 254-66 (discussing the three-part approach for
reviewing tribal court decisions on post-exhaustion review).
134. See id. at 266-80 (proposing the extent of federal court review depending on the basis
for federal court jurisdiction).
135. See Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian
Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and Federal
Governments, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 973, 1035 (2000) (discussing unfavorable methods of
resolving the problem).
136. See Reynolds, supra note 85, at 577 (noting that "the lack of a formal tribal court
system is usually due to inadequate resources and expertise").
137. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 283 (2008)
While such a practice offends the American notion of separation of powers,
serious erosions of tribal sovereignty would occur if Congress forced the tribes
to create a separate judicial branch.1 38 Finally, even if a tribal court exists, the
tribal code might only allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians
if they consent. 139 Whatever the reason, any permanent solution must address
situations in which no tribal forum is available to resolve the dispute.
B. Problems in the Criminal Jurisdiction Context
Because of the limited ability of tribal courts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, most of the problems inherent in the tribal court
relationships with state and federal courts concem civil jurisdiction. Some
problems, however, do arise in the criminal jurisdiction context. For example,
does a violation of tribal law by a parolee constitute a parole violation? 140 In
addition, because tribal court judgments fit within the Dual Sovereign
exception to double jeopardy, defendants who plead guilty in tribal court may
not realize the ramifications of their pleas on later federal prosecutions,,
41
especially because many of them do not necessarily have the benefit of
counsel. 142 Even worse, the tribal court judge may not know the ramifications,
and may therefore be unable to advise the defendant on them. 143 To solve these
problems, tribal courts, along with their federal and state counterparts, must
develop better communication methods to make this key information readily
available.
Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1,5 (1997) (discussing the need for tribal court independence from
the control of the tribal council).
138. See Thorington, supra note 135, at 983 (arguing that incorporating certain concepts
from American justice systems into tribal court systems would "undermine what is left of the
traditional systems").
139. See Reynolds, supra note 85, at 577 (noting that such restrictions appear in tribal
ordinances that "follow[] the model provided by the Department of the Interior").
140. See B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging
Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457,511
(1998) (recognizing that tribal courts may not be aware of the probationer's status and may not
fully advise them as to whether pleading guilty in tribal court may revoke his parole status).
141. See id. at 510 ("Few tribal judges would like to be in a position of accepting a plea in
tribal court after advising the pro se defendant, erroneously perhaps, that his or her plea will
have no impact in federal court.").
142. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (containing no right to counsel provision), with
U.S. CO ST. amend. VI (granting a right to counsel).
143. See Jones, supra note 140, at 510 (noting the uncertainty over the admissibility of
noncounseled tribal court guilty pleas in federal courts).
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Perhaps the biggest problem concerning the present state of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction, however, is finding a solution to the growing problem of
misdemeanors committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.'44
After Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, tribal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction
over these claims, and the General Crimes Act similarly bars state court
jurisdiction over them. 145 Because federal prosecutors have limited resources
and spend most of their time investigating more serious crimes, they are
unlikely to devote the requisite amount of resources to resolving the problem.
46
While increasing federal funding or expanding either tribal or state court
jurisdiction would solve this problem, Congress has done neither, 147 and the
situation badly needs a remedy.
C. Conflict ofLaws Concerns
When providing a place for tribal courts in the federal system, Congress
should consider the possibility of a conflicts-based approach, similar to those
utilized by state courts. While state courts utilize a variety of choice of law
doctrines, 14 courts hearing cases between Indians and non-Indians rarely
conduct any form of choice of law analysis.149 Several possible reasons may
help to explain why those courts fail to perform a choice of law analysis, "o but
none of them provide a sufficient reason for the continued avoidance of that
analysis. This subpart establishes some of the conflicts of law problems,
including which law should apply and how to handle judgment enforcement.
144. See id. at 513 (discussing the jurisdictional gap that occurs in those situations).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Public Law 280 was one such attempt, but the confusion over how much jurisdiction
the states could assume hindered its usefulness. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text
(describing the jurisdictional confusion resulting from the enactment of Public Law 280).
148. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL CASES AND MATERIALS 302 (2d ed. 2003) (providing a chart summarizing the
choice of law methods utilized by each jurisdiction).
149. See Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles
ShouldApply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1629 (2006) ("[C]ourts
have tended to treat the issues of which forum should hear a case and which law should be
applied to it as if they were a single question-simply assuming... that the forum in which the
case is brought will apply its own law.").
150. See id. at 1676-96 (discussing three objections to applying tribal law in state courts).
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1. Which Law Should Apply?
The biggest hurdle to applying tribal law in state and federal courts is that
much tribal law is unwritten.'15 Many tribal courts rely on tribal customs and
ancient traditions to resolve disputes, but tribal constitutions and tribal codes do
not always reflect these practices.15 2 Because of the lack of a written set of
laws, American judges are highly unlikely to apply laws based on tribal custom
with the accuracy of the tribal courts. 5 3 While judges in one state will not
know the laws of a foreign state as well as judges in that state, the foreign state
has a written code that is similar to the code in the forum state, which may, or
may not, be the case if the foreign law is tribal law.
154
In contrast, many tribal courts have a great deal of familiarity with
American laws because their tribal codes follow an American model.
55
Additionally, tribal judges often look to federal and state law to fill in gaps in
the tribal code. 56 Applying state or federal law in tribal court, however, raises
other more basic problems. Because of a lack of funding, most tribal courts do
not have the research capabilities of state and federal courts. 57 Thus, while the
foreign law may be written in a way that tribal court judges can easily
understand, the judge may be unable to locate a copy of the foreign law or the
cases that interpret it.158 Even if the tribal court has access to the requisite
information, many states may not be comfortable with a tribal court applying
151. See id. at 1630 (noting that "[i]n some tribes, elders who do not speak English
administer tribal law").
152. See O'Connor, supra note 137, at 3 ("Tribal court judges frequently are tribal
members who seek to infuse cultural values into the process.").
153. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1630 ("[T]ribes and their members are generally better
off if disputes involving tribal matters are heard in tribal forums.").
154. See Thorington, supra note 135, at 982 (noting that some tribes continue to use the
model codes and constitutions, while others have developed their own law and order codes).
155. See Jones, supra note 140, at 471 ("[M]any of the laws in the old C.F.R. resemble
many of the constitutional and statutory provisions contained in modem-day tribal codes.").
156. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 106 ("Tribal custom is subordinated to federal law and
when no tribal custom or law applies, Navajo courts are encouraged to examine the law of the
appropriate state.").
157. See Jones, supra note 140, at 476 (listing structural problems faced by modem tribal
courts that include funding, organization, and technology).
158. See id. (noting "a lack of electronic resources to manage and retrieve court
information").
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their laws. 5 9 In addition, applying state or federal law in tribal court may
seriously undermine tribal sovereignty.160
2. Problems with Judgment Recognition
Another choice of law issue that frequently arises in tribal court
relationships with other courts is the issue ofjudgment recognition. This issue
is extremely important in the state/tribal context because state courts cannot
place liens on Indian property. 16  Assuming a state court can exercise
jurisdiction over an Indian, any remedies awarded against the Indian can only
come from his or her off-reservation property, unless the tribal courts recognize
the judgment. 62 Similarly, if a tribal court enters a judgment against a non-
Indian, the damages that the tribal court can award are limited to the on-
reservation property of the non-Indian, which is usually minimal. 163 Because
the judicial proceedings of Indian tribes are not entitled to full faith and credit
under the Constitution,164 most courts have determined that considerations of
comity decide whether the state court must enforce the judgment of the tribal
court, and vice versa.' 65 In response, commentators have proposed many
159. See Thorington, supra note 135, at 983 ("The non-tribal courts view tribal courts as
less legitimate because tribal courts are based on different values and assumptions.").
160. See id. (noting that familiar American legal doctrines such as free speech "tend[] to
undermine what is left of the traditional systems").
161. See id. at 1017 ("Even in P.L. 280 states, only the tribe or the federal government can
do any act that would result in the encumbrance, alienation or taxation of Indian property."
(citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 1993))).
162. See Jones, supra note 140, at 478 (noting the futility of resolving the jurisdictional
conflict if appropriate enforcement mechanisms are not in place).
163. See William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" is Full Faith and Credit
Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REv. 219, 221 (1987) (noting that, at least for cases involving
automobile accidents, nonmembers usually do not own property on the reservation).
164. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (2000) (noting that full faith and credit extends to "any State, Territory, or Possession of
the Unites States").
165. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805,809-10 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that principles of comity govern whether federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal court
judgments); Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
Arizona courts are not required to give full faith and credit to enactments of a Navajo tribal
council); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977) (stating that the full faith and
credit clause is not applicable to Indian tribes). But see Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895,
901 (Idaho 1982) (determining that tribal adoption decrees are entitled to full faith and credit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 1975) (finding
that the laws of the Navajo Nation are entitled to full faith and credit).
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different theories on the appropriate standard by which tribal and state courts
should recognize each other's judgments. 66 Whichever method of judgment
recognition is chosen, Congress must address whether the solution should be
uniform throughout the country, or whether each state should determine its own
standard. 1
67
D. Forum Shopping and Fundamental Fairness Concerns
In addition to the nightmarish problem of fitting tribal courts into the
federal system, Congress must address basic issues of fairness when designing
a statutory solution to the problem of tribal court jurisdiction. For example, a
non-Indian cannot sue an Indian defendant in state court for a dispute arising on
the reservation, but an Indian plaintiff can sue a non-Indian in state court for
the same violation. 68 Clearly, an Indian plaintiff could choose the most
favorable forum, while the non-Indian must bring his action in tribal court,
which is most likely not his forum of choice. 169 Another fundamental fairness
question arises in situations where a non-Indian is forced to exhaust tribal court
remedies despite raising a federal question issue in the original complaint. 7 °
By requiring the federal court to stay its hand, the exhaustion doctrine gives
tribal courts greater deference than similarly situated state courts.
7'
166. See generally Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal
Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239
(1993) (discussing several different solutions to the recognition ofjudgment problem); see also
Jones, supra note 140, at 483 n. 116 (citing a wide sampling of proposed solutions).
167. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition andEnforcement ofJudgments:
A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REv. 311, 335-46 (2000) (discussing the various
approaches taken by state courts).
168. Compare Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (concluding that a state cannot
exercise jurisdiction over an Indian defendant for an incident arising on the reservation), with
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 888 (1986) ("[T]ribal autonomy and self-
government are not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its court to seek relief
against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country.").
169. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 90 (noting a Supreme Court assumption that non-
Indians will be disadvantaged in tribal courts).
170. See Niblock, supra note 109, at 239 (raising this question).
171. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,21 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that federal courts often hear federal question claims despite
a pending action in state court).
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E. Issues of Tribal Sovereignty
Although the rampant problems with the current system indicate a need for
change, any proposition to modify the current state of tribal jurisdiction must also
include an analysis of how the proposed changes will affect tribal sovereignty.
Because congressional statutes and Supreme Court decisions have greatly eroded
tribal sovereignty, Indian culture has lost much of its previous uniqueness. 72 In
fact, many tribes had to adopt Anglo-like tribal constitutions to receive federal
recognition. 173 Even the ICRA, with its Anglicized notions of individual rights,
imposed responsibilities on the tribal courts that were foreign to them.
1 74
Fortunately, all tribal court systems still maintain some traces of their heritage,
and many tribes rely heavily on tribal customs and traditions as a means to
enforce laws. 175 While the use of unwritten customs in a court proceeding is
foreign to the American adversary process, those customs remain an important
part of tribal culture, and they need to be preserved as much as possible. 1
76
V. Potential Solutions That Treat Indian Tribes Like Other Political Entities
Because Congress maintains plenary power over the Indian tribes, it can
pass any form of legislation it desires to solve the extensive problems with the
current system of tribal-federal-state relations. By treating the tribes as states,
foreign nations, administrative agencies, or federal territories, Congress could
enact sweeping changes with very little effort. Nevertheless, "Indian tribes
occupy a unique status under our law,"'177 and treating them like some other
172. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978) (concluding that
Indian tribes cannot criminally punish non-Indians); Jones, supra note 140, at 468-69
(discussing the traditional approach to murder cases in tribal systems before the enactment of
the Major Crimes Act).
173. See id. at 471 ("Not surprisingly, because of the need of the Indian tribes to receive
permission from the Department of the Interior to supplant the C.F.R. with their own code,
many tribes parroted many of the provisions of law contained in the C.F.R. courts to appease the
Department of the Interior.").
174. See id. at 474 (listing three ways in which the ICRA "forces Indian tribes to mimic
their judicial systems upon state and federal courts").
175. See id. at 475 ("[M]any Indian tribes have returned to their indigenous roots and
regained a sense of tradition in the dispute resolution practices they currently utilize.").
176. See id. at 467 ("Anglo legal system[s] abhor a system of unwritten law based upon
customary practice and tradition."); Valencia-Weber, supra note 6, at 249 ("Achieving
regularity through publication and codification of custom helps legitimate the tribal courts and
allay the fears of nonmembers about tribal courts.").
177. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
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entity would most likely destroy any remaining semblance of Indian culture. This
Part discusses the feasibility of each of these classifications.
A. Treat Indian Tribes Like States
Because the relationship between states and the federal government is the
most refined, the most comprehensive solution that Congress could implement
is to treat the Indian tribes like states. Of the four comparisons discussed in this
Part, Indian tribes have the most in common with states. For example, both
Indian tribes and states are located within the boundaries of the United States
and both rely on the federal government for protection, although to different
extents. In addition, tribal prosecutions, like their state counterparts, fit within
the Dual Sovereign exception to double jeopardy.
1 78
Indian tribes also have much to gain by receiving state status. By treating
the Indian tribes like states, Congress would implicitly give tribal court
judgments full faith and credit in state and federal courts, 179 and tribal courts
could avail themselves of the vast array of procedural devices that govern the
relationship between federal and state courts, including removal. 80 More
importantly, tribal courts would become courts of general jurisdiction,' and
they would obtain the power to hear claims under § 1983,182 while also vastly
expanding their criminal jurisdiction.
8 3
178. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (finding that the dual
sovereignty exception applies to tribal courts); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)
(discussing the negative effects associated with barring dual prosecutions in state and federal
court).
179. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). While some
commentators question the utility of requiring Indian tribes to afford full faith and credit to state
court judgments, the tribes could at least benefit from having their judgments entitled to full
faith and credit. See Kelly Stoner & Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or
Federal Mandate? A Path that Leads to Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders,
Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REv. 381,387 (2004)
("While it would beneficial for tribes to have their orders given full faith and credit by the states,
the price of reciprocity is too taxing and costly for Indian tribes.").
180. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (providing for removal from state court to federal
district court), with Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 368 (2001) (noting that the removal statute
does not apply to Indian tribes).
181. But see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367 ("Tribal courts... cannot be courts of general
jurisdiction [because] ... a tribe's inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at
most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction.").
182. But see id. at 369 ("[T]ribal courts cannot entertain § 198,3 suits.").
183. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) (denying tribal court jurisdiction over serious
offences between tribal members); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210
310
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In addition to the jurisdictional benefits the tribal courts would receive as
state courts, the tribal courts would also benefit from several judicial canons of
interpretation afforded to state courts. For example, "Federal courts do not
interpret state laws in the first instance." 1 84 Unfortunately, federal courts do not
always give that same respect to tribal law, especially when no tribal court
exists to interpret the law. 85 More importantly, federal courts only review state
court determinations of subject matter jurisdiction on direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.186 While the exhaustion doctrine allows the tribal court to
assess its jurisdiction in the first instance, the federal court still can overrule the
tribal court determination. 87 By giving tribal courts the benefit of these canons
of interpretation, Congress and the federal courts will give greater respect to the
decisions of the tribal courts.
Despite the significant benefits of state status, Indian tribes also have
much to lose from the conferral of state status. For instance, Indian tribes
currently are not subject to suit in state courts because of tribal sovereign
immunity, 188 but states are subject to suit in the courts of sister states.
189
Because the tribes were not present at the Constitutional Convention and have
not ratified the Constitution, implying a waiver of their sovereign immunity is
patently unfair. 190 Treating tribes like states for immunity purposes also
(1978) (concluding that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). To
grant state status to the Indian tribes, Congress must repeal the Major Crimes Act, overrule
Oliphant, and modify the ICRA to allow harsher sentencing. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 73, 77, amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207, 3353 (1986) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
(2000)) (noting the current sentencing power of tribal courts).
184. Pace, supra note 71, at 461 (citing Carroll v. United States, 923 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.
1991)).
185. See Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1474(9th Cir. 1989) (interpreting
a tribal ordinance in federal court despite the lack of a tribal court).
186. See Royster, supra note 125, at 254 (noting the possibility for a collateral attack on
tribal court jurisdiction in federal court despite the lack of a comparable proceeding to attack
state court determinations).
187. See id. ("To that extent, then, the federal district courts act as appellate courts for the
tribal judicial decisions.").
188. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,509
(1991) ("Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver
by the tribe or congressional abrogation." (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
58 (1978))).
189. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,328-29 (1934) (noting that
by adopting the Constitution, states mutually waived their sovereign immunity in each other's
courts).
190. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) ("[I]t would be
absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not
even parties.").
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presents Eleventh Amendment problems. By subjecting states to suit in tribal
courts, Congress effectively would abrogate the state's sovereign immunity,
and Congress may not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity using its
commerce power.191
In addition to the Eleventh Amendment concerns, treating tribes as states
raises other constitutional concerns as well, especially under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 192 Presently, "Tribes are not states and therefore the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to them."'193 As a result, many of the protections
afforded by the Bill of Rights do not apply to Indian tribes, most importantly,
the right to counsel 94 and the right to ajury trial for offenses not punishable by
jail time.195 Even more troubling for a non-Indian defendant, many tribes place
tribal membership requirements on jury service, so ajury consisting entirely of
Indians tries the non-Indian defendant. 196 While such a practice ordinarily
constitutes discrimination based on race, the Supreme Court has noted that
"where the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian
self-government, we cannot say that Congress' classification violates due
191. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
192. See U. S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State... without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress."); Rebecca Anita Tsosie, What Does it Mean to "Build a
Nation"? Re-Imagining Indigenous Political Identity in an Era of Self-Determination, 7 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 38, 53-54 (2006) ("In the United States, the equal citizenship claim is most
often raised by non-Indians who are protesting the 'special rights' that Indians enjoy or the
ability of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members, which is perceived to violate the
'civil rights' of the non-members.").
193. James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes, 59
MONT. L. REv. 51, 74 (1998).
194. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2000) (providing for a right to counsel only at the expense
of the accused).
195. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (2000) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial byjury of not less than six persons."), with U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...."
(emphasis added)), and U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing a right to jury trial in civil cases
when the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars). Under relevant case law, federal
courts do not require jury trials for crimes punishable by less than six months. See Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (ruling that a jury is required for offenses "where the
possible penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment").
196. See Poore, supra note 193, at 77 (noting that such a practice "cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny").
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process."' 197 If the tribe were subject to the Fourteenth Amendment as a state,
however, such a provision would clearly be unconstitutional.'9"
Besides the constitutional problems that would result from treating Indian
tribes like states, severe erosions of inherent tribal sovereignty would occur.
First, tribal courts would fall under the diversity statute, as well as the
provisions that allow the removal of actions from state to federal courts.' 99
With those procedures available, the federal courts would compete directly with
the tribal courts, which would hinder their development.2 °° Similarly, if tribes
were states, they would be subject to the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
which would allow the federal courts to intrude even further on tribal
sovereignty by exercising jurisdiction in cases that rightfully belong in tribal
court."'
Finally, if Congress forced the Indian tribes to adhere to all the
requirements of due process and equal protection, tribal courts would face total
assimilation into the Anglo-American culture. While some tribal courts are
nearly identical to corresponding state courts, many tribal courts still rely
heavily on unwritten custom. 20 2 Because notice is a major concern of due
process, tribal courts could not rely on custom unless it was written into the
tribal code.20 3 Similar concerns arise when tribes merge the judicial and
executive branches.2 °4  In addition, forcing Indian tribes to adhere to the
197. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
198. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986) ("The core guarantee of equal
protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be
meaningless were we to approve the exclusion ofjurors on the basis of such assumptions, which
arise solely from the jurors' race.").
199. See Niblock, supra note 109, at 236 (noting that in this respect, "tribal courts have a
greater scope of power than the state courts").
200. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[U]nconditional access to
the federal forum would place it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing
the latter's authority over reservation affairs."); see also Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism"
in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts'
Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. CoLO. L. REv. 123, 162 (2000) ("[R]emoval can be
seen as antithetical to federal policy supporting tribal court development.").
201. See Pommersheim, supra note 200, at 158 (arguing that supplemental jurisdiction,
while a simple issue in the federal-state relationship, is not readily applicable to tribal courts).
202. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 104-05 (discussing the differences between
"traditional" and "western" tribal courts).
203. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) ("Elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty
that a State may impose.").
204. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 109 (arguing for maintaining the current system of
exclusive jurisdiction for tribes that do not have independent judiciaries).
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American notions of separation of church and state and judicial review "tend[]
to undermine what is left of the traditional systems.',20 5 Thus, at least for Indian
tribes with traditional tribal courts, obtaining state status is not desirable.
B. Treat Indian Tribes As Foreign Countries
In contrast to the loss of sovereignty that would result from a conferral of
state status on the Indian tribes, Congress could provide the greatest amount of
protection for inherent tribal sovereignty by passing legislation that treats
Indian tribes as independent foreign nations. While Indian tribes have not been
considered foreign nations for centuries,20 6 Congress, using its plenary power,
could grant that status to Indian tribes. In fact, the United States entered into
many treaties with several different Indian tribes before Congress outlawed that
practice in 1871,207 illustrating the plausibility of this classification. In
addition, tribal sovereign immunity is similar to foreign sovereign immunity in
that Congress controls both as a matter of federal law.2 °8
While treating Indian tribes as independent countries is a plausible
solution, modem Indian tribes have little in common with foreign nations.
From an international law standpoint, Indian tribes most likely are not
sovereign nations. 209 Even so, Indian tribes have much to gain from this
classification. For starters, by considering Indian tribes as independent
countries, tribal sovereignty would be maximized. Congress need not concern
itself with the jurisdiction of tribal courts, nor with the interaction between
tribal courts and federal or state courts. Instead, the Indian tribes would have
complete discretion to make any laws they wish, and the U.S. courts would
recognize tribal judgments based upon considerations of comity, which is the
current status quo in most jurisdictions .21 Because tribal courts would have
205. Thorington, supra note 135, at 983.
206. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5. Pet.) 1, 19 (1831) (finding that Indian
tribes are not foreign nations because they are not foreign to the United States).
207. See Act ofMar. 3, 1871,ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (2000)) ("[H]ereafter, no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty."). For a list of early treaties between the United States and
the Cherokee Nation, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 538 (1832).
208. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998) ("Like foreign
sovereign immunity, tribal immunity is a matter of federal law.").
209. Tsosie, supra note 192, at 41 (noting the lack of clarity as to how to classify
indigenous people under the attributes of sovereignty posed by international law).
210. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (listing holdings from several jurisdictions
on how to handle the recognition of tribal judgments).
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exclusive jurisdiction over all causes of action within their territory, the tribal
courts need not worry about federal and state courts hindering their
development.
Even with the advantages of granting foreign nation status to the Indian
tribes, Congress is highly unlikely to pass such legislation because it would
have to surrender its plenary control as well as its ownership of all Indian lands.
Currently, Indians cannot own land outright,211 and ownership of all land within
the territory is a prerequisite to becoming a foreign nation. By granting Indian
tribes independence, the United States would be at the mercy of the Indian
tribes, who could demand whatever they wanted in exchange for passage
through their territory. Even worse, most Indian tribes do not possess the
military capabilities to withstand invasion, and their lands would be prime
targets for terrorists seeking to threaten the United States. For tribes that have
no court system in place, lawlessness would run rampant, and that lawlessness
could spill over into neighboring states. Besides, most tribes would struggle to
survive if Congress left them to sink or swim on their own.
212
Aside from the political and practical difficulties associated with treating
Indian tribes as independent foreign nations, potential constitutional problems
exist as well. For example, the Commerce Clause lists Indian tribes separately
from foreign nations, thus providing a constitutional basis for differential
treatment.1 3 More importantly, if Indian tribes are foreign nations, then tribal
membership is inconsistent with U.S. citizenship.21 4 Thus, because Indians are
215citizens of the United States, the tribes to which they belong cannot be
classified as foreign nations. Further, considering the current debate over
illegal immigration, having independent nations within U.S. borders would
pose enormous regulatory problems.21 6
211. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 465 (2000)) ("Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act shall be taken
in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which land
is acquired .... ).
212. See Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TULSA L.J. 385, 396
(1993) (arguing that most tribes are either too small or not economically self-sufficient enough
to secede from the United States).
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"
(emphasis added)).
214. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (reasoning that a person could not
become a citizen of the United States without giving up allegiance to a foreign power).
215. See 8. U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2000) (declaring that Indians born in the United States are
citizens at birth).
216. See Tyche Hendricks, On the Border, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 2006, at Al, available at
2006 WLNR 22485792 (noting the negative impact of illegal immigration on Indian tribes
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C. Treat Indian Tribes As Administrative Agencies
While treating Indian tribes as independent foreign nations would most
heavily favor the Indian tribes, treating them as administrative agencies would
have the opposite effect, heavily favoring the federal government at the expense
of tribal sovereignty. If Congress classified Indian tribes as agencies, Congress
or the Executive Branch would exercise complete control over the tribes, and
very little semblance of tribal sovereignty would remain. Despite the
devastating effects on tribal sovereignty, modem tribal courts resemble
agencies in many aspects. In fact, at least two current members of the Supreme
Court feel that an Indian tribe's authority over nonmembers is similar to the
powers of an administrative agency.
217
Modem tribal courts resemble administrative agencies in several ways.
First, the tribal court's jurisdiction is coextensive with the Indian tribe's
legislative jurisdiction.218 Second, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) appoints
some Indian judges if the federal government pays the judge's salary.219 Third,
at least for tribes that do not operate a court system, the Courts of Indian
Offenses220 are federal courts, which the BIA, a federal agency, operates.
221
Finally, and most significantly, the tribal exhaustion requirement bears a stark
resemblance to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.222
along the Mexican border).
217. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,227 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the congressional delegation of the power to try nonmembers to the various tribes is akin to
the way Congress delegates lawmaking power to administrative agencies). Justice Scaliajoined
this opinion. Id.
218. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) ("[A] tribe's inherent adjudicative
jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction."); see also
Alfred R. Light, Sovereignty Myths and Intergovernmental Realities: The Etiquette of Tribal
Federalism, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 373, 392 (2001) (noting that tribal courts are more like
agencies than sovereign states in this sense).
219. See Thorington, supra note 135, at 982 (describing such a scenario for tribes that have
adopted model codes).
220. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2007) (establishing such courts). Commentators often refer
to these courts as "CFR courts." Jones, supra note 140, at 470.
221. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406, 54,407 (Oct. 21,
1993) ("It is clear. .. that Courts of Indian Offenses are part of the Federal Government."
(citing United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir.
1987))).
222. See Koehn, supra note 126, at 721-22 (comparing statements establishing the tribal
exhaustion doctrine with an administrative law treatise); but see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note,
Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering the Defenses of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH. L. REv. 569, 585 (2002)
(noting that the tribal exhaustion doctrine has no guidelines that establish the level of review,
unlike administrative agencies, which are guided by the Administrative Procedure Act).
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Despite the similarities between tribal courts and the administrative
agencies, enough differences remain to prevent Congress from treating Indian
tribes like agencies. Most notably, Indian tribes retain some level of inherent
sovereignty.223 While Congress can eradicate that sovereignty at any time,
modem federal policy favors tribal self-determination, and placing tribal courts
directly under federal control strongly contradicts that policy. 224  More
importantly, until the Supreme Court is "prepared to recognize absolutely
independent agencies entirely outside of the Executive Branch with the power
to bind the Executive Branch ... , the tribes cannot be analogized to
administrative agencies. ' 225 Key Supreme Court precedent makes such a result
highly unlikely.
226
D. Treat Indian Tribes As Federal Territories
Of the four possibilities discussed in this Note, Indian tribes bear the
strongest resemblance to federal territories. For instance, Indian tribes vary
widely in size and structure, much like territories do.227 More importantly,
although neither Indian tribes nor territories have direct representatives in
Congress, "[t]he continued political existence of both depend on the will of
Congress. 228 In addition, custom plays a role in both types of courts, and
direct review of local decisions by federal courts threatens cultural identity.
229
Finally, some courts have determined that Indian tribes are the same as
230territories.
223. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("[O]ur cases recognize that
the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty.").
224. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing modem federal Indian
policy).
225. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
226. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (concluding that "Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws
except by impeachment"). An Indian tribe's ability to prosecute tribal members is an essentially
executive power. See infra notes 239-241 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional
problems that would result if tribal governments executed federal prosecutorial powers).
227. See Vetter, supra note 163, at 237-44 (discussing the differences in various U.S.
territories).
228. Id. at 270.
229. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power
of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REv. 643, 752-53 (2004) (discussing problems with direct
appellate review of territorial courts in American Samoa).
230. See Mackeyv. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1855) ("[The Cherokee Nation] is
not a foreign, but a domestic territory-a territory which originated under our constitution and
laws."); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (agreeing that the phrase
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Because of the strong similarities between the two classifications,231
Congress would most likely prefer this classification system to the other three
alternatives discussed in this Part. First, Congress would maintain plenary
control over the Indian tribes and their territories, which avoids many of the
problems inherent in classifying the Indian tribes as foreign nations. In
addition, the current status of the Indians is similar to the status of territorial
natives, so tribal culture could be preserved for the most part.232  More
importantly, the United States has a long, well-developed history concerning
the treatment of territories to rely upon, and Indians could retain their
citizenship status without the constitutional problems associated with granting
the Indian tribes state or foreign nation status.
Despite the similarities between Indian tribes and federal territories, a few
key differences indicate that this classification would be unsatisfactory. 233 For
example, while the full faith and credit statute applies to territories, 234 most
courts have held that it does not apply to Indian tribes.235 Although Congress
"Territories and Possessions" includes Indian tribes); but see Exparte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 306
(W.D. Ark. 1883) ("[The Cherokee Nation] belong[s] to the republic, though [it is] neither a
state or territory in it."); Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(concluding that an Indian reservation is not a territory for full faith and credit purposes).
231. See Daina B. Garonzik, Comment, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Federal
Courts Perspective: A ProposedAmendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J.
723, 749 (1996) (noting many similarities between tribal courts and territorial courts in Guam,
the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands).
232. See Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good
Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REv. 331, 374 (2005) (arguing that the modem
approach "allows the insular areas to be full-fledged parts of the United States but, at the same
time, recognizes that their cultures are substantially different... and allows some latitude in
constitutional interpretation for the purpose of accommodating those cultures"). This article is
replete with references to culture in American Samoa, many of which are analogous to Indian
culture.
233. See Vetter, supra note 163, at 272 (arguing against this classification). According to
Vetter:
In fact, there appears to be only one factor which opposes a conclusion that Indian
tribes are "territories" for purposes of the full faith and credit implementing
statutes: the political distinction between the Indian and the remainder of the
United States polity. That factor is also the theoretical basis for "Indian law."
From a legal theory or ideological point of view, it is the single factor which
counsels strongly against, and indeed prevents, a conclusion that Indian tribes are
"territories" within section 1738.
Id.
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (noting that full faith and credit extends to "any State,
Territory, or Possession of the Unites States").
235. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
principles of comity govern whether federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal court
judgments); see also Vetter, supra note 163, at 249-59 (providing numerous arguments as to
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could easily remedy that problem by amending the statute, applying full faith
and credit to the tribes would imply that the federal government created the
tribal governments, and such an implication is inconsistent with the federal
policy of promoting tribal sovereignty.236
While Congress could alter the full faith and credit statute to accommodate
the Indian tribes without too much damage to tribal sovereignty, a much more
serious hurdle remains. The Supreme Court has held that tribal court
prosecutions fit within the Dual Sovereignty exception to double jeopardy.237
Because territorial courts receive all their power from congressional delegation,
their prosecutions are the same as federal prosecutions.238 Thus, treating Indian
tribes like territories would eliminate a key aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty
in direct violation of modem policy.
Even if Congress could completely disregard inherent tribal sovereignty,
Congress would face "grave constitutional difficulties" if it attempted to
delegate the power to bring federal prosecutions to the Indian tribes.23 9 As
Justice Thomas noted, because the power to bring federal prosecutions is a
"quintessentially executive power," Congress could not delegate this power to
persons that the Executive cannot control. 240 Thus, Congress would have to
grant the Executive Branch at least some authority to appoint and remove tribal
court judges, which would face strong opposition from the Indian tribes.24'
Such a blatant abuse of tribal sovereignty makes this option no more attractive
to the Indian tribes than receiving treatment as administrative agencies, which
would suffer from similar constitutional shortcomings.
why Congress did not intend that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 apply to Indian tribes).
236. See Vetter, supra note 163, at 265-67 (arguing that because Indian tribes possess a
right to self-government created by a higher power, they do not fit within the traditional theory
that full faith and credit only applies to members of the "federal polity"). Full faith and credit,
however, offers several advantages to the Indian tribes that may be worth the loss of
sovereignty. See Garonzik, supra note 231, at 726 (noting that while tribal sovereignty may be
diminished by a full faith and credit mandate, tribal courts would gain "a substantial degree of
judicial authority").
237. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the dual sovereign exception for tribal court
prosecutions).
238. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978) ("[S]uccessive prosecutions
by federal and territorial courts are impermissible because such courts are 'creations emanating
from the same sovereignty."' (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937))).
239. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
240. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
241. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the President apparently has no control
over tribal judges).
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VI. A Proposal for a More Tailored Solution
As the above discussion demonstrates, Indian tribes are unlike any other
political entity. Thus, to fit tribal courts into the existing system, a more unique
solution is necessary. In crafting a solution, Congress should focus on four
main goals: (1) maximizing tribal sovereignty, (2) protecting the constitutional
rights of non-Indians, (3) protecting Indian culture, and (4) providing a
substantial amount of flexibility to better accommodate the various differences
among individual Indian tribes.242 This Part proposes such a solution
("Proposal") by discussing changes to three different areas. First, the Proposal
alters the existing jurisdiction of the tribal courts and accommodates the effects
of those changes on the federal and state courts. Next, the Proposal establishes
a comprehensive structure for the tribal court system to eliminate jurisdictional
gaps. Then, the Proposal provides various procedural mechanisms to control
the way that tribal courts interact with federal and state courts. Following this
discussion, this Part addresses some potential problems created by the Proposal.
A. A Proposal to Modify the Present State of Tribal Court Jurisdiction
As previously noted, the current state of tribal court jurisdiction relies on a
mixture of congressional policy and Supreme Court precedent. That mixture
has led to a complex system of rules, which often produces unfair or
inconsistent results. 43 Because judicial systems should strive for consistency
and fairness, 244 Congress, using its plenary power over Indian affairs, should
throw out the existing system and create a statutory system that more clearly
defines the extent of tribal court jurisdiction. By relying on statutes as a
jurisdictional source, Congress can provide a complete solution to the problem
instead of allowing the Supreme Court to institute a system piecemeal.245
Because tribal court jurisdiction varies depending on the type of
jurisdiction at issue, the Proposal affects the jurisdictional system in three ways.
First, it addresses needed changes to tribal court criminal jurisdiction. Second,
242. Focusing on these four goals provides incentives for approval by both tribal members
and non-Indians.
243. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (providing an example of such inconsistent
results).
244. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The rules] shall be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
245. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1633 ("[M]ost of the principles that determine whether
a case should be brought in state or tribal court are the result of judicially formulated, fact-
specific solutions to the problems presented by individual cases.").
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it proposes radical changes to the current state of tribal court civil jurisdiction.
Finally, the Proposal describes how changes to tribal court jurisdiction affect
the jurisdiction of state and federal courts in these areas.
1. Proposed Changes to Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
Currently, tribal courts cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.24 In addition, while tribal courts can exercise criminal jurisdiction
over Indians, the Major Crimes Act and the ICRA severely limit the extent of
247that jurisdiction. Because Indian tribes retain some of their inherent
sovereignty, however, their prosecutions fit within the Dual Sovereign
exception to double jeopardy.248 As it exists, this system provides very little
protection of tribal sovereignty.
To secure the greatest amount of tribal sovereignty, tribal court criminal
jurisdiction should be expanded. More specifically, tribal court criminal
jurisdiction should extend to all violations of tribal law not covered by the
Major Crimes Act. One of the key aspects of sovereignty is a nation's ability to
enforce its own laws within its borders.249 By allowing tribal courts to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all persons who violate its laws, tribal sovereignty
would dramatically increase. In addition, by allowing the Indian tribes to
enforce their own laws, the burden on federal prosecutors would decrease
because they would not need to worry about prosecuting minor crimes that
occur in Indian country.25°
While increasing the extent of tribal court criminal jurisdiction vastly
extends tribal sovereignty, Congress should retain the limitations imposed by
the Major Crimes Act. Given the seriousness of the crimes listed in the Act,
the risk of nonprosecution in federal court is minimal.25' More importantly,
federal courts provide greater constitutional protections than tribal courts are
246. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (finding that
Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
247. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing those limits).
248. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing tribal courts and double jeopardy).
249. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) ("A basic attribute of full territorial
sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory,
whether citizens or aliens.").
250. See supra notes 144-46 (discussing the growing problem of misdemeanors committed
by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country).
251. Jones, supra note 140, at 513 (implying that federal prosecutors focus more attention
on serious crimes).
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required to provide.252 Because criminal defendants receive greater rights than
ordinary litigants, tribal courts should not exercise jurisdiction over major
crimes unless they are willing to provide the minimum level of protection
provided for in the Constitution.253 For that reason, Congress should include a
clause that allows an Indian tribe to exercise full criminal jurisdiction in
exchange for adopting full constitutional protections. 4  By allowing the
individual Indian tribes to make the ultimate choice, Congress can fully protect
non-Indians without intruding on tribal sovereignty and culture.
In a similar manner, Congress should adjust the range of tribal court
punishments available under the ICRA to meet constitutional requirements, at
least when jurisdiction over nonmembers is at stake. Supreme Court precedent
mandates that the right to counsel attaches when a court sentences the
defendant to jail time. 255 Because the ICRA allows Indian tribes to imprison
criminal defendants up to one year in jail, 256 its protections do not meet the
constitutional minimum. Even worse, by expanding tribal court criminal
jurisdiction, Congress would provide jurisdiction for a greater variety of crimes,
including felonies, which might require even harsher punishment.257 To
balance tribal sovereignty with the civil rights of nonmembers, however,
Congress should allow the tribal courts to distribute harsher sentences to
members of its own tribe, while limiting the punishment of nonmembers to
fines. While that practice appears to violate equal protection, tribal members,
who have more rights in Indian country than nonmembers,258 have waived some
of their constitutional protections byjoining the tribe.259 Much like the option
of exercising full criminal jurisdiction, Congress also should provide individual
Indian tribes with the option to provide greater punishments if it adopts the full
protections provided in the Constitution.
252. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (noting the constitutional infirmities
in tribal courts).
253. See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text (providing examples of the extra
constitutional protections tribal courts could provide).
254. Those rights include larger juries, a right to counsel, and Miranda warnings.
255. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (holding that counsel is required before
a defendant can be sentenced to jail time).
256. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000); see also id. § 1302(6) (providing for a right to counsel
only at the expense of the accused).
257. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), which did not require counsel for defendants charged with felonies).
258. See Poore, supra note 193, at 76 (noting that tribal members enjoy the right to vote in
tribal elections, while nonmembers do not).
259. Id. at 74.
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In sum, Congress should make several changes to the current model of
tribal court criminal jurisdiction. First, Congress should allow tribal courts to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, subject only to the penalty
provisions of the ICRA. Second, Congress should allow each Indian tribe to
exercise jurisdiction over all crimes committed by its members within its
territory, except for those crimes specifically listed in the Major Crimes Act.
Third, Congress should provide each tribe with the option of exercising full
criminal jurisdiction over all crimes within its territories if it is willing to adopt
the full protections of the Constitution. Finally, Congress should do nothing to
upset the current Dual Sovereign exception from double jeopardy that Indian
tribes enjoy.
260
2. A Proposal to Expand Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction
a. Presumptive Civil Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts
Civil litigants enjoy fewer special constitutional protections than criminal
defendants. 26' Therefore, Congress should do away with the confusing tests of
civil jurisdiction created by the Supreme Court and provide tribal courts with
full civil jurisdiction over almost all actions that arise within their territory. 62
In addition, Congress should allow Indian tribes to exercise some jurisdiction
over events that occur outside of their territory as long as they have a minimum
level of contacts with the parties in question.263 By presuming that most cases
involving Indians or their territory originate in the tribal system, Congress could
encourage the growth and development of tribal courts264 while increasing
tribal sovereignty.
260. See supra Part III.A.2 (establishing the current treatment of tribal court prosecutions
for double jeopardy purposes). This Note provides no opinion on the constitutional
permissibility of three consecutive criminal prosecutions by tribal, state, and federal courts.
261. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (providing a higher standard for impeachment of
criminal defendants than other witnesses). More importantly, prosecutors face a higher burden
of proof than civil plaintiffs do. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (noting that the
"'demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from
ancient times"' (quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (1954))).
262. See infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text (discussing an exception for
jurisdiction over foreign parties)
263. See generally Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
264. See Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-559, § 2(7), 114 Stat. 2778, 2778 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3651(7) (2000))
(finding that "enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems serves the
dual Federal goals of tribal political self-determination and economic self-sufficiency").
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In addition, tribal courts, like state courts, also could exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over related state and federal claims.265 Under the
current system, litigants often face the prospect of litigating tribal claims in
tribal court and similar state or federal claims in their respective courts, 266 but
this Proposal eliminates the need for Indian litigants to travel to a distant state
or federal court to file a claim when a similar claim exists under tribal law. In
addition, addressing all related claims in one court promotes judicial
efficiency,267 while improving tribal court understanding of American law.268
b. Maintaining Some Limits on Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction
(1) Limits on Supplemental Jurisdiction
Despite improving judicial efficiency, allowing tribal courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims may represent an
unconstitutional erosion of state sovereignty.269 For that reason, tribal courts
should refuse to accept supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when a
federal court would not exercise such jurisdiction.27° While preventing tribal
courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims limits
judicial efficiency, Congress should not give tribal courts greater jurisdiction
over state law claims than the federal courts have.27' Besides, federal court
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (2000) (providing removal of federal claims from state court
if the federal court could have exercised original jurisdiction). If state courts could not hear
federal claims, this statute would be unnecessary.
266. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 96 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court generally presumes that the
selected venue will apply its own law.").
267. See City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) ("[W]hen
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 'a federal court should consider and
weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity."' (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988))).
268. When tribal courts apply nontribal law, they must consult relevant statutes and
precedent to determine what the law means. As they analyze nontribal law with increasing
frequency, they develop a greater familiarity with it.
269. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
270. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (requiring the related claims to "form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution"); see also id. § 1367(c)
(providing four situations when federal courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims).
271. In fact, constitutional limits may prevent Congress from transferring that much
jurisdiction from state court to tribal court, but that issue is not relevant to the discussion.
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refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims presents the
same efficiency concerns, yet neither the state courts nor the federal courts have
become completely overwhelmed by the additional burden.
In addition to the tribal court's limited ability to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims, tribal courts also should not exercise
jurisdiction over foreign parties.2 72 Simply put, America's relationships with
foreign powers mandates that only federal courts should hear claims involving
noncitizens. While state courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over noncitizens,
Congress arguably could provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction over these
claims under the Constitution.273 Tribal courts, on the other hand, should not
exercise jurisdiction over foreign citizens until the tribal court systems develop
more fully. 274 In particular, tribal courts should gain more experience with
American laws, which are foreign to them, before expanding their reach to
include laws from foreign countries, which may require translations from any
number of languages into the native tongue. In addition, the problems tribal
courts face in applying American laws would multiply substantially if tribal
courts could exercise jurisdiction over foreign parties.
275
(2) Adjustments to Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Adjusting the extent of tribal sovereign immunity provides Congress with
276another mechanism to limit the extent of tribal court jurisdiction. In its
current form, tribal sovereign immunity is broader than foreign nation
sovereign immunity.277 To remedy that situation, Congress should subject the
Indian tribes to an immunity system similar to the one found in the Foreign
272. That is, parties foreign to the United States, such as resident aliens.
273. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to...
Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2000) (allowing a foreign state to remove actions to
federal court).
274. See Jones, supra note 140, at 476-77 (noting several areas where tribal judges lack
the benefits possessed by state and federal judges).
275. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with
applying American law in tribal courts).
276. See Carlson, supra note 222, at 581 ("[F]ederal courts should hear defenses of tribal
sovereign immunity first because sovereign immunity pertains to the court's jurisdiction.").
277. See John W. Borchert, Comment, Tribal Immunity Through the Lens of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Warrant for Codification?, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 247,249-50
(1999) (noting that tribal sovereign immunity is broader than the immunity enjoyed by states,
municipalities, and foreign nations).
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Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).2 8 Subjecting Indian tribes to this standard
remedies some of the existing problems with the current system. 79 In fact,
modem tribal immunity doctrine suffers from some of the same flaws that
doomed the absolute immunity approach to foreign nation immunity.28 ° More
importantly, "domestic dependent nations" should not receive greater immunity
protection than fully independent sovereigns.281
Although applying tribal immunity in the context of the FSIA provides a
statutory basis for analyzing tribal immunity, the tribes would actually lose
some aspects of their inherent sovereign immunity.282 Considering the potential
for abuse of civil rights under the existing system,283 a less protective standard
of tribal immunity is justifiable. In fact, most foreign nations adhere to a
restrictive form of sovereign immunity, like that found in the FSIA, and this
284Proposal simply holds Indian tribes to the same standard as those nations.
With presumptive jurisdiction in the tribal courts under this Proposal,
Congress must abrogate tribal immunity in the tribal courts. Otherwise, the
limits on tribal immunity would be meaningless. Because the tribes are not
states, however, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Congress from
abrogating tribal immunity.285 Thus, the restrictions on Congress's authority to
abrogate sovereign immunity using its commerce power are inapplicable.286 In
278. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § § 1604, 1605, 1607 (2000)); see also Borchert, supra note
277, at 265-66 (indicating the "close nexus between these two areas of law").
279. See Borchert, supra note 277, at 247-48 (providing an example of egregious behavior
by one Indian tribe for which the victim had no remedy because of tribal sovereign immunity).
280. See id. at 264 ("Rather than honoring foreign states, absolute immunity gave foreign
states an unfair advantage in their business transactions and denied private citizens legal
recourse for injuries suffered at the hands of a foreign state.").
281. See id. at 278 ("[A] doctrine that shields tribes with immunity, where ... foreign
sovereign counterparts would not be protected, contradicts the principle that tribes should be
considered 'dependent sovereigns"').
282. Compare United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940) (ruling
that Indian tribes do not waive sovereign immunity on otherwise immune claims that were
pleaded in a counterclaim to an action brought by the tribe), with 28 U.S.C. § 1607(b) (2000)
(preventing foreign nations from asserting immunity for counterclaims "arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign state").
283. See Borchert, supra note 277, at 247-48 (providing an example of egregious behavior
by one Indian tribe for which the victim had no remedy because of tribal sovereign immunity).
284. See id. at 264 ("By the 1920s, this theory was the emerging norm of customary
international law.").
285. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States... ." (emphasis added)).
286. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment Immunity using its commerce power).
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addition, congressional plenary power, which Congress does not have over
foreign sovereigns, provides strong support for the abrogation of tribal
immunity in this manner.28 7
c. Answering the Critics
Despite the above limitations, some critics adamantly oppose the
proposed expansion of tribal court civil jurisdiction.88 In fact, commentators
have argued that subjecting non-Indians to civil jurisdiction in tribal courts
may be unconstitutional because some tribal courts do not benefit from the
American notion of separation of powers. 289 Theoretically, a non-Indian
could not receive a fair and impartial trial in a court that lacks the guarantee
of freedom from local control by the tribe. While that argument has some
merit, Americans who travel to other countries remain subject to jurisdiction
in those countries, yet many countries around the world do not have the
complex governmental structure found in the United States. 290 Besides, the
proposal requires state and federal courts to enforce any judgment entered
against a non-Indian with no property in Indian country. 291 Thus, adequate
procedural protections exist to protect non-Indians from unfair treatment in
tribal courts.
287. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) ("As a matter of
federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the
tribe has waived its immunity.").
288. See Darrel Smith, America's Surprisingly Diverse Reservations, http://www.
citizensalliance.org (follow "Major Issues" hyperlink; then follow "America's Surprisingly
Diverse Reservations" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) ("[U]p to 3,300,000 non-Indians
might lose their constitutional protections and the right to vote in the governments that would
exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over them.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
289. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 109 (arguing for maintaining the current system of
exclusive jurisdiction for tribes that do not have independent judiciaries); Thorington, supra
note 135, at 983 (arguing that incorporating certain concepts from American justice systems into
tribal court systems would "undermine what is left of the traditional systems").
290. For example, even Great Britain does not provide for "American-style judicial
review." Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative ConstitutionalAdvocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 553,562
(2007).
291. See infra Part VI.C.3.b (proposing a method to deal with judgment enforcement).
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3. Adjustments to State and Federal Court Jurisdiction Resulting from
Increased Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Although tribal court jurisdiction increases dramatically under this
Proposal, state and federal courts must yield some of their existing jurisdiction
to the tribal courts for it to work. Because Congress controls the jurisdiction of
the federal courts,2 92 the changes to their jurisdiction will not cause much
uproar. Reducing the jurisdiction of the state courts, however, presents greater
challenges. This section discusses the necessary changes to federal and state
court jurisdiction below.
With the tribal court exercising presumptive jurisdiction over tribal affairs,
federal courts no longer would exercise jurisdiction over these claims. While
that action may seem unusual, federal courts currently do not assert jurisdiction
over these claims until the litigants exhaust all available tribal remedies.2 93 Of
course, the exhaustion doctrine eventually allows the federal court to hear the
claim because it does not relinquish jurisdiction. 94 Under this Proposal, the
federal courts do not retain jurisdiction over the claims; instead, the standards
of review on appeal ensure protection of the federal interests at stake.295
Like the federal courts, state courts lose some jurisdiction because of the
presumption of tribal court jurisdiction over tribal affairs, especially in Public
Law 280 states. To promote the growth of tribal court systems, Congress must
prevent state courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that rightly belong
in tribal court. If not, state courts would provide direct competition to tribal
courts, and with most non-Indians preferring to litigate in familiar American
courts, tribal court growth would be stunted.296 Unfortunately, some Indian
tribes do not have the resources to establish adequate tribal court systems, 297 so
Congress must provide a way for those tribes to transfer their jurisdiction to
state courts, if they desire such a transfer.
292. See U.S. CoNsv. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress the power "[tlo constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court").
293. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845,857 (1985) (requiring
the federal court to "stay[] its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to
determine its own jurisdiction").
294. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n.8 (1987) (noting that the
exhaustion rule "did not deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction").
295. See infra Parts VI.C. 1-2 (discussing the standards of review on appeal).
296. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 90 ("The Court has suggested that, if given the choice,
forum-shopping litigants.., will turn to state courts, undermining tribal court jurisdiction.").
297. See Shelly Grunsted, Full Faith and Credit: Are Oklahoma Tribal Courts Finally
Getting the Respect They Deserve?, 36 TULSA L.J. 381,395 (2000) (implying that adding a mere
100 enforcement cases per year would place severe financial hardship on some tribal courts).
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Despite the rampant problems with Public Law 280, it can provide a
method to facilitate the transfer of tribal court jurisdiction to state courts.
Before that transfer can take place, however, the current statute needs
modification. Most importantly, Congress should provide the tribes who lost
jurisdiction under this system with a mechanism for reacquiring their
jurisdiction.298 The most feasible solution is to provide for a tribal initiated
retrocession, which would allow the various tribes to petition the federal
government for a return of their previous jurisdiction. 299 The Indian tribes,
however, should file their petition for retrocession within two years of the
passage of this proposed amendment. By providing a statute of limitations,
Congress could ensure that Indian tribes do not wait in perpetuity to exercise
this unilateral option.
After the two-year limit, Public Law 280 should continue to operate in
much the same way it does now, with state courts assuming jurisdiction over
Indian territory only with the consent of the tribes.300 The statute, however,
should also include a provision that returns the jurisdiction to the tribes with the
consent of both the state and the tribe. Including a mutual consent provision
provides the tribes and the states with the flexibility to adjust to changing
circumstances, while encouraging cooperation between the tribes and the states.
B. The Structure of the Proposed Tribal Court System
To implement the jurisdictional changes discussed above effectively,
Congress must develop a tribal court system that provides as much consistency
as possible. Given the size and economic disparities among the various Indian
tribes, that task will be difficult.30 For the Proposal to work, Congress must
ensure that every tribe has a court system to enforce its laws.
298. Jimrnez & Song, supra note 100, at 1693-94 (proposing modifications to the current
system).
299. This provision should provide for a return ofjurisdiction to the extent requested by
the tribe. Thus, the tribes could exercise as much jurisdiction as they were capable of
exercising, while allowing the state court to exercise jurisdiction over the remainder. For
example, the tribes could opt to exercise full civil jurisdiction, while leaving criminal
jurisdiction up to the state.
300. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2000) (requiring tribal consent for a state assumption of
criminal jurisdiction); id. § 1322(a) (requiring tribal consent for a state assumption of civil
jurisdiction).
301. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1640 (noting that "some tribes are too small or poor to
maintain judicial systems").
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1. A Court for Every Tribe
First, Congress should provide a Court of Indian Offenses (CFR court) for
every tribe that does not currently operate a functional tribal court. While most
tribes have either a tribal court or a CFR court, some tribes share one CFR
court;30 2 those tribes should separate and receive their own court, unless they
agree to merge and form a unified government. Because CFR courts are federal
courts, they are bound by the Constitution,0 3 and they provide greater
procedural protections than many tribal courts, including the right to counsel,
3°4
larger juries,30 5 and a Miranda requirement.3 °6 Even so, CFR courts have lesser
sentencing power than similarly situated tribal courts.307  As the BIA
recognized, these differences are important because they encourage the tribes to
adopt their own court systems to change anything they oppose.308
2. Tribal Appellate Courts for Larger Tribes
Currently, CFR courts shut down when the tribes under their jurisdiction
adopt their own court system.30 9 Congress, however, should maintain the CFR
courts as appellate courts for tribal decisions, at least for larger tribes.310
302. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § I 1.100(a)(12) (2007) (listing numerous Oklahoma tribes that are
served by a single CFR court).
303. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406, 54,408 (Oct. 21,
1993) ("Courts of Indian Offenses, however, are Federal instrumentalities and are bound not
only by the ICRA, but by the requirements of the United States Constitution as well.").
304. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 11.205(a) ("No defendant in a criminal proceeding shall be
denied the right to counsel."), with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2000) (providing for a right to counsel
only at the expense of the accused).
305. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 11.314(b) (providing for a jury consisting of eight Indian
residents), with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (providing a right to a jury of six people).
306. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.303 (providing for Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation).
307. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 11.315 (allowing a maximum sentence of six months
imprisonment and a $500 fine), with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (providing a maximum sentence of
one year in jail and a $5,000 fine).
308. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,407 ("Indian tribes
served by Courts of Indian Offenses are authorized to create their own tribal court systems
should they desire to assume additional jurisdiction.").
309. See id. (providing several examples of tribes that converted their CFR courts into
tribal courts).
310. Congress should develop an estimate of the caseload in the lower tribal courts to
determine if an appellate court is necessary. Obviously, most tribal populations are much
smaller than state populations, so a reference to state populations is inappropriate. See Ransom
et al., supra note 166, at 247 (noting that "New York is ten thousand times as big as the San
Juan Pueblo" in population terms). But see Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider:
330
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Because appellate courts function differently than trial courts, some of the rules
and procedures in the CFR courts would need adjusting. Even so, Congress
should retain key differences between the CFR courts and similar tribal
appellate courts to encourage the tribes to create a tribal-operated appellate
court.3 ' While the larger tribes are more likely to have a developed tribal court
system in place, Congress should provide a CFR appellate court for any tribe of
sufficient size that does not currently operate one. Once the tribes create their
own appellate courts, the BIA can eliminate the CFR appellate court.
While this intricate tribal court system is expensive to implement,31 2 it
provides many benefits. First, because of the extra protection provided by the
CFR courts, reviewing federal courts are more likely to recognize the
judgments.31 3 Second, additional levels of tribal courts require more Indian
judges, and the BIA should give Indians first priority when choosing judges for
the CFR courts. 31 4 Third, non-Indian litigants and judges are more likely to
respect a system that provides adequate appeal mechanisms because those
systems are more familiar and they reduce the possibility of errors.3 15 Thus, the
tribal courts will become more respected members of the judicial community.
316
3. Creating a New Federal Circuit Court ofAppeals
Once the intricate tribal court system is in place, Congress needs to
provide a system of federal review to ensure that the tribal court did not violate
the constitutional rights of the parties. To achieve that goal, Congress should
create a new "Court of Appeals for the Indian Circuit (CAIC)" to hear any cases
appealed from the highest-level tribal or CFR court.3 17 Although this solution
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1047, 1069 (2005)
(noting the largest tribe has over 300,000 members).
311. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406, 54,407 (Oct. 21,
1993) ("Indian tribes served by Courts of Indian Offenses are authorized to create their own
tribal court systems should they desire to assume additional jurisdiction.").
312. See infra Part VI.D.2 (discussing the costs of the proposed system).
313. See infra Part VI.C.3.b (discussing the appropriate standards for judgment
recognition).
314. See 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2007) (providing for preference in employment within the BIA).
This requirement should extend to CFR courts, which the BIA operates.
315. See Minzner, supra note 15, at 90 (noting a Supreme Court assumption that non-
Indians will be disadvantaged in tribal courts).
316. See O'Connor, supra note 137, at 2 (arguing that to gain the respect of the nontribal
community, "tribal courts need to be perceived as both fair and principled").
317. For the remainder of this subpart, I will refer to both tribal-run tribal courts and CFR
courts as tribal courts.
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sounds extreme, Congress has provided for specialized appellate courts in other
uniquely federal contexts. 318 Like the other courts of appeals, decisions of the
CAIC would be reviewable by the Supreme Court.
In the CAIC, at least half of the judges should be Indians. By requiring
participation by Indian judges, Congress can better maintain the balance
between tribal sovereignty and constitutional protection. Because the Indian
judges are familiar with tribal law and custom, they can provide a tribal
viewpoint that is otherwise lacking in traditional federal courts. 3 19 At the same
time, the non-Indian judges are more familiar with the Constitution, and they
can better protect the rights of the non-Indian parties. While Congress could
save money by providing for appellate review in the existing circuits, those
courts may have differing views, forcing the Supreme Court to become more
involved on appeal. 320 By providing one unified voice on issues of Indian law,
Congress could bring much needed consistency to a field of law full of
uncertainty.32'
C. Procedural Devices to Control Interactions Between Tribal Courts and
Federal and State Courts
Although this Proposal nearly eliminates the potential for concurrent
jurisdiction between tribal courts and state or federal courts, Congress must
enact procedural mechanisms to allow the courts to interact effectively. While
some of those procedures are already in place, they are judicial rules that need
codification.322 In addition, Congress has a wide variety of possibilities to
choose from to resolve typical conflict of laws concerns. 323 By implementing
the Proposal, Congress can provide a mechanism for tribal courts to fit in the
American court system, while maintaining the uniqueness of tribal law.
318. For example, Congress created the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals primarily to hear
all appeals involving patents. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (3d ed. 2002).
319. See O'Connor, supra note 137, at 3 ("Tribal court judges frequently are tribal
members who seek to infuse cultural values into the process.").
320. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 318, at 10-11 (describing the wide divergence "as
to doctrine and basic attitudes toward patents" that led to the creation of the Federal Circuit as a
way to unify patent doctrine).
321. See Reynolds, supra note 85, at 602 (arguing that "the current set of rules delineating
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction contains numerous inconsistencies and fails to create a
cogent theory of tribal court adjudication").
322. See infra Part VI.C.2 (discussing the standards of appellate review in the CAIC).
323. See infra Part VI.C.3 (proposing solutions for tribal court choice of law rules and the
recognition of tribal judgments).
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1. Levels of Review in the CFR Appellate Courts
Assuming Congress finds a need for a tribal appellate court, the solution
must address which levels of review will apply in the CFR appellate courts.
For the answer, Congress needs to look no further than routine federal law on
the subject. As any lawyer knows, federal appellate courts apply different
standards of review depending on the procedural posture of the case. Simply
put, the CFR courts, as federal courts,3 2 4 should apply the appropriate standard
of review to lower court findings of law and fact. Thus, the CFR appellate
court could review tribal court findings of law on a de novo standard, even
though it is not technically a tribal court.325 If tribal leaders do not like the idea
of federal courts reviewing a tribal court application of tribal law, those leaders
could enact appropriate legislation to create a new tribal-run appellate court.3 26
2. Levels of Review in the CAIC
Because the tribe cannot take over the CAIC, however, appellate review in
that court requires a more complex solution. In situations when tribal interests
are at stake, federal courts should continue to adhere to the principles of the
exhaustion doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court.327 The codified Proposal,
however, should alter the way federal district courts address the issue. Because
of the availability of review in the CAIC, federal district courts should dismiss
all cases with tribal connections, just like the state courts that do not have
consent from the tribes. By funneling all cases with tribal contacts into the new
tribal court systems, the tribal courts could develop more rapidly.328 Just as
important, the CAIC would interpret all questions of tribal court jurisdiction,
329
thus providing a uniform view on the extent of tribal court jurisdiction.
324. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406, 54,408 (Oct. 21,
1993) ("Courts of Indian Offenses, however, are Federal instrumentalities and are bound not
only by the ICRA, but by the requirements of the United States Constitution as well.").
325. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005) ("We apply de novo
review to questions of federal law.. ").
326. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,407 ("Indian tribes
served by Courts of Indian Offenses are authorized to create their own tribal court systems
should they desire to assume additional jurisdiction.").
327. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the exhaustion doctrine).
328. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985)
(arguing that exhaustion furthers the congressional policy of "supporting tribal self-government
and self-determination").
329. This statement is true except, of course, for those rare decisions that would be
overturned by the Supreme Court.
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Although the Proposal changes the function of the exhaustion doctrine, it
maintains the important principles embodied within the doctrine.330 More
importantly, by establishing presumptive jurisdiction in the tribal courts, the
Proposal eliminates the existing questions of when to apply exhaustion,33 1 but
the principles of exhaustion come in concerning the levels of review available
in the CAIC. The CAIC, however, should only exercise appellate jurisdiction
over claims that otherwise belong in federal court, either by way of federal
question jurisdiction332 or diversity jurisdiction.333 After granting the appeal,
the CAIC should utilize the three-level standard of review currently used by the
334federal courts in exhaustion cases.
First, federal courts provide full deference to tribal courts on questions of
tribal law.335 That standard of review maintains the highest level of tribal
sovereignty because it ensures that tribal courts are the final interpreters of their
own laws-"tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.,
' 336
Under this standard, the new federal court could not overturn any question of
tribal law, with the exception of jurisdiction.
337
Second, while some commentators argue for a more deferential standard
of review,338 federal courts review tribal court findings of fact using a clear
error standard. 339 Although state court findings of fact are binding on the
federal courts, the full faith and credit statute demands that result. 340 Because
330. Specifically, the Proposal provides a method to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
and the availability of review by the CAIC will eliminate challenges to tribal court jurisdiction
in the federal district courts because the CAIC's decisions are entitled to full faith and credit.
331. See Koehn, supra note 126, at 728-48 (discussing several key issues presented by the
current exhaustion doctrine).
332. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
333. See generally id. § 1332.
334. See Royster, supra note 125, at 254-66 (discussing the three-part approach for
reviewing tribal court decisions on post-exhaustion review).
335. Id. at 255.
336. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
337. See infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text (providing a standard of review for
questions of tribal court jurisdiction).
338. See Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by
the Federal Judicial System, 78 MIN. L. REV. 259, 299-306 (1993) (strongly advocating
absolute deference on tribal court findings of fact).
339. See Royster, supra note 125, at 261-63 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of this approach).
340. See Joranko, supra note 338, at 301 n.272 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 binds federal
courts to state court findings of fact).
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tribal court judgments do not receive full faith and credit under this Proposal,3 6'
their findings of fact should not receive full faith and credit either. By applying
a clear error standard to tribal court findings of fact, the CAIC can avoid the
incongruous outcomes that would result with a more stringent standard of
review,342 while maintaining the freedom to overturn tribal courts' findings that
are clearly incorrect.
Third, federal courts review tribal court determinations of federal law on a
de novo standard. 43 While that standard allows inconsistent results in different
courts, it is the appropriate standard because "federal courts are the final
arbiters of federal law."344 Even though state court determinations of federal
law are only reviewable in the Supreme Court, the Court reviews a state court's
decision de novo.345 Similarly, federal appellate courts review federal district
court interpretations of state law on a de novo basis, so all federal courts apply
346this standard when reviewing questions of federal law. Because federal
courts always use this standard, they should apply this standard of review to
tribal court determinations of federal law as well.
While the existing three-tiered system of federal review provides a
foundation for appellate review in the CAIC, additional standards are needed.
First, what level of review applies to tribal court determinations of state law?
Because federal courts review determinations of federal law on a de novo
standard, they should apply that same level of review to tribal court
determinations of state law. In fact, to ensure maximum protection for state
sovereignty, the federal court ideally should certify the state law question to the
state supreme court,34 7 but because federal courts often apply state law when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction, 348 de novo review in the federal court
341. See infra Part VI.C.3.b (advocating for a comity-based approach to recognizing tribal
judgments).
342. See Royster, supra note 125, at 261-62 (providing an example of the anomalous
results that would occur with a higher standard of review).
343. Id. at 263.
344. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990).
345. See Royster, supra note 125, at 264-65 (indicating that in the rare instances when the
Supreme Court grants certiorari, it reviews state court determinations of federal law under a de
novo standard).
346. See id. at 265 ("De novo review on federal law issues previously determined by
another court is thus the only standard with which the federal courts are familiar and
comfortable.").
347. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997) (noting
the benefits of a certification procedure).
348. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
state law claims that are "part of the same case or controversy under Article i1").
65 WASH. &LEE L. REV 283 (2008)
provides enough protection for the state's interests if certification is
unavailable.
The final, and most difficult, problem is determining which level of review
should apply to questions of tribal court jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question.349 Tribal codes,
however, contain their own jurisdictional provisions,35° so a tribal advocate
could argue that tribal court jurisdiction is a question of tribal law entitled to
absolute deference. While this Proposal would create a statutory scheme of
tribal court jurisdiction, the statute is a federal one, subject to congressional
amendment, so tribal court jurisdiction ultimately remains a matter of federal
law. In fact, tribal court jurisdiction often provides the only basis for federal
court jurisdiction, 3 1 and if tribal jurisdiction is not reviewable in federal court,
then the CAIC often would not have a basis for jurisdiction.352 Because the
Proposal eliminates state court jurisdiction over tribal affairs, not allowing the
federal courts to provide a check on the exercise of tribal jurisdiction would
allow the tribal courts to determine their jurisdiction at will, which presents
serious potential constitutional problems.353
3. Conflict ofLaws Concerns
In addition to procedural mechanisms that govern appeals through the new
tribal court system, this Proposal provides answers to the difficult conflict of
laws questions that arise from increased tribal jurisdiction. First, expanding
tribal jurisdiction creates situations when tribal courts can exercise jurisdiction
outside of their territory, so tribal courts need a system of choice of law rules to
decide which law to apply. Worse still, even if the tribal court can exercise
jurisdiction over a non-Indian, the court still must rely on state or federal courts
349. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845,852 (1985) (determining
that a challenge to the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction constitutes a federal question).
350. See, e.g., Kennerly v. Dist. Ct., 400 U.S. 423, 425 (1971) (referencing part of the
Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order Code providing for concurrent tribal court jurisdiction).
351. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW INA NUTSHELL 218-19 (4th ed.
2004) (noting the dramatic increase in federal jurisdiction resulting from the holding in National
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
352. Of course, the CAIC could still exercise jurisdiction under the diversity statute or
through supplemental jurisdiction in the appropriate circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (providing for
supplemental jurisdiction).
353. For example, an Indian tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, in
violation of the proposed statute. If it did not provide the constitutional protections afforded to
all criminal defendants, a constitutional violation of rights would occur.
336
IN A CLASS BY THEMSEL VES
to enforce its judgments when the non-Indian does not own property within
Indian country. This section addresses both choice of law procedures and
issues of judgment recognition in more detail below.
a. Choice of Law Procedures
With the expansion of tribal jurisdiction provided by this Proposal, new
choice of law issues arise in two separate situations. First, tribal courts must
develop a set of rules to decide which law applies when it exercises jurisdiction
under its long arm statute.354 Second, in the rare event that a state or federal
court exercises jurisdiction over claims involving tribal law,355 those courts
need to decide whether to apply tribal law or forum law.
(1) Choice of Law in the Tribal Courts
When a tribal court exercises long arm jurisdiction, a potential choice of
law question arises. For example, suppose that a non-Indian has an accident
within Indian country, injuring a tribal member. In this situation, the tribal
court clearly has jurisdiction under this Proposal because one of the parties is a
tribal resident. While the tribal court has jurisdiction, either tribal law or the
law of the domicile of the non-Indian could apply. 356 Thus, the tribal court
needs a procedure to determine which law should apply.
To provide maximum flexibility and promote tribal sovereignty, Congress
should allow the tribes to determine which choice of law system they want to
apply.357 Because of the importance of tribal sovereignty, the interest of the
tribal forum will provide a major hurdle to applying nontribal law, no matter
which choice of law system the tribe chooses.358 Besides, even without the
added emphasis on tribal sovereignty, most of the choice of law methods
354. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (making this method of jurisdiction
available to tribal courts).
355. See infra notes 362-65 and accompanying text (discussing several ways for a
nontribal court to obtain jurisdiction).
356. See SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 148, at 3 (describing the basic choice of law
inquiry).
357. A discussion of the various choice of law approaches is not within the scope of this
Note. For more information on the various approaches, see id. at 16-305.
358. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1674-75 (noting that using interest analysis or the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws approach allows courts to consider the interests of
the tribe separate from the interests of the litigants).
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usually favor the forum state. 359  Despite the strong preference for the
application of tribal law, some situations mandate a contrary result, and tribal
courts must be able to apply nontribal law in order to gain more respect among
state and federal courts. 3 60  Similarly, when the tribal court exercises
supplemental jurisdiction over state or federal law claims, the foreign law
usually will apply, so the tribal court needs to become familiar with applying
both state and federal law.
(2) Choice of Law in Nontribal Courts
Just as tribal courts need to develop choice of law approaches to determine
which law to apply, state and federal courts need to consider the option of
applying tribal law under their choice of law rules.36 1 Although jurisdiction
over cases that involve questions of tribal law will normally arise in the tribal
courts, state and federal courts can obtain jurisdiction in a variety of ways. The
easiest way, perhaps, is for the tribe to consent to state jurisdiction under the
modified version of Public Law 280.362 In addition, many tribal codes, and the
CFR courts, do not currently allow the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over
non-Indians without consent.3 63 Theoretically, Indian tribes would amend their
respective tribal codes with the passage of this Proposal, but if they do not, state
or federal courts can exercise jurisdiction in the appropriate cases.3 4 Finally,
state and federal courts could exercise jurisdiction when the tribal court
determines that it does not have jurisdiction over the cause of action. For
359. See SYMEONIDES ETAL., supra note 148, at 172-73 (providing data showing that only
four of the forty cases studied did not apply forum law). The one method that does not heavily
favor the forum is the so-called "traditional approach" of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of
Laws, which tends to focus more on notions of territoriality. See SYMEONIDES ETAL.,supra note
148, at 19-20 (discussing the territorial nature of the traditional approach).
360. By correctly applying the law from other jurisdictions, tribal judges can demonstrate
their legal skills to federal and state judges, who, in turn, are more likely to respect the
judgments from tribal courts. See O'Connor, supra note 137, at 2 (arguing that to gain the
respect of the nontribal community, "tribal courts need to be perceived as both fair and
principled").
361. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1650 (arguing that states should consider applying
tribal law under their choice of law principles).
362. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (providing this option).
363. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1640-41 (noting that many tribes limit access to their
courts to tribe members).
364. Federal courts could exercise jurisdiction under the federal question or diversity
statutes. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2000). Meanwhile, state courts, as courts of
general jurisdiction, could easily acquire jurisdiction if it involves a resident of the state.
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example, the tribal court may not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
non-Indian to exercise personal jurisdiction over him or her.365
Whatever the basis for federal or state jurisdiction, the nontribal court
should consider applying tribal law if its choice of law rules dictate such a
result. Despite the problems with applying tribal law in nontribal courts,366 the
application of tribal law in state and federal courts promotes tribal sovereignty
by deferring to the tribe's wishes.367 More importantly, the need to apply tribal
law in nontribal courts creates a greater demand for documentation of tribal
codes and tribal court decisions.368 While sources of tribal law are currently
limited, Congress can provide extra funding to improve the access to tribal law,
as well as tribal court access to federal and state law.
369
As a minor procedural note, most states will need to create an exception to
the penal law exception under its choice of law rules.370 For example, if the
tribe has a tribal code, but transfers jurisdiction to the state under Public Law
280, this Proposal requires an application of tribal law. 371 If that law is criminal
in nature, however, the penal law exception would apply.372 To remedy this
problem, the grant ofjurisdiction should include tribal permission for the state
court to enforce tribal criminal law.373
365. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319(1945) ("Whether due process is
satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure.").
366. See id. at 1676-96 (discussing several potential problems to the application of tribal
law in state court).
367. See id. at 1691 (noting several advantages of applying tribal law in state courts).
368. See Jones, supra note 140, at 476 (noting the "lack of a thorough compilation of tribal
court decisions"); Valencia-Weber, supra note 6, at 242 ("Because of the recency of many tribal
courts, 'much tribal court litigation involves cases in which there is no controlling authority."'
(quoting Frank Pommersheim, Liberations, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal
Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 411, 454 (1992))).
369. See Florey, supra note 149, at 1692 (noting that many larger tribes maintain well-
financed court systems with "Web-searchable libraries of decisions or equivalent resources").
With increased funding, Congress could vastly enlarge the database maintained by the National
Tribal Justice Resource Center. See id. at 1692 n.341 (providing a link to a database containing
"codes, constitutions, by-laws and judicial opinions from more than fifty tribes").
370. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825) ("The courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another.... ").
371. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (providing this option).
372. See SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 148, at 90-95 (discussing the penal law
exception).
373. The author makes no guarantees as to the constitutionality of such a contract. At
worst, the Supreme Court would find such a grant unconstitutional, and the system would
operate as it does currently.
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b. Judgment Recognition
This Proposal accomplishes very little if tribal courts, state courts, and
federal courts do not determine a method for recognizing each other's
judgments. Fortunately, this Proposal dramatically simplifies the problem. The
CAIC, as a federal court, receives full faith and credit in other American
courts.374 Because the CAIC usually hears appeals from the tribal courts, it can
perform a judgment recognition analysis during the appeal to increase
efficiency. Even if the parties do not appeal the case to the CAIC, other state
and federal courts should utilize the same approach to ensure consistency.
Therefore, what approach should the CAIC use?
While commentators have proposed numerous solutions to the problem,
375
no consensus view has yet to develop. Although Congress has provided for full
faith and credit to tribal court judgments in some instances, 376 most courts have
determined that a comity approach offers the best solution.3 77 Finally, one
prominent Indian law scholar has proposed a system known as "asymmetry,"
which represents a comity-based approach in which tribal courts and nontribal
courts consider different factors to determine whether recognition is
appropriate.378 Whatever the approach, Congress should implement it in
statutory form to ensure a uniform result in all three court systems.379
Specifically, the chosen approach must take into account issues of tribal
sovereignty, or the tribes will rebel against it.
One potential approach to the recognition of tribal court judgments is to
grant them full faith and credit.380 Granting full faith and credit to tribal court
374. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.... ." (emphasis added)).
375. See generally Ransom et al., supra note 166. Abundant scholarship exists on this
topic. For a rather large representative sample, see Robert Laurence, The Role, if any, for the
Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Federal, State and Tribal Money
Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1, 3 n.3 (1999).
376. See Leeds, supra note 167, at 332-33 (indicating that the Violence Against Women
Act, The Indian Child Welfare Act, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and the Child
Support Orders Act require full faith and credit to tribal judgments).
377. See supra note 165 (listing several cases that have addressed this issue).
378. See Laurence, supra note 375, at 36 (setting forth the various factors for courts to
consider under his asymmetric view).
379. See id. at 34 ("The rule of recognition for the enforcement of tribal judgments off-
reservation or the enforcement of state judgments on-reservation must be a federal rule, binding
on state, federal and tribal courts.").
380. See generally Garonzik, supra note 231.
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judgments provides a higher level of respect for the tribal courts.3"' In addition,
as long as jurisdiction is proper, recognition is automatic, so the court's task is
easier under this approach.382 Despite the advantages of a full faith and credit
system, forcing tribal courts to extend full faith and credit to nontribal
judgments presents several challenges to tribal sovereignty. For example, many
tribes view a grant of full faith and credit to state court judgments as "giving up
some of their inherent power to the state." 383  From a nontribal court's
perspective, forcing the court to give full faith and credit to tribal judgments
prevents it from ensuring that the tribal proceeding protected basic standards of
due process.
384
Because Congress has a constitutional duty to protect American citizens
from violations of due process, full faith and credit is not currently a viable
option. In fact, even the most fervent tribal advocates would not require full
faith and credit to judgments from traditional tribal courts, which follow
arbitration-like procedures.385 Indian tribes, however, should have the option to
participate in a full faith and credit regime with the consent of the states,
assuming the tribal court agrees to provide a minimal level of constitutional
protection. 386 By providing a negotiation-based option, Congress serves the
dual goals of encouraging tribal-state relations and providing a maximum level
of flexibility to allow the tribes to make their own sovereign decisions.
While the full faith and credit approach presents many problems, a comity-
based approach offers a more feasible solution. As a doctrinal starting point,
the Ninth Circuit has established a detailed comity-based approach to deal with
381. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 6, at 237-38 ("If the court's mandates do not seem to
require compliance, then the court does not have legitimacy.").
382. See Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in
American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity andAsymmetry,
18 QuINNIPAc L. REv. 115, 125 (1998) (listing the types of collateral attacks allowed under a
full faith and credit approach).
383. Grunsted, supra note 297, at 395; see also id. at 390-91 (noting that when given the
option of accepting full faith and credit at the expense of reciprocating, only fifteen of the thirty-
six federally recognized tribes in Oklahoma exercised that option); Stoner & Orona, supra note
179, at 387 (arguing that the influx of state influence would "soften the resistance of the Indian
tribes to assimilation").
384. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he tribal court
proceedings must afford the defendant the basic tenets of due process or the judgment will not
be recognized by the United States.").
385. See Laurence, supra note 382, at 147-50 (arguing that strong advocates for full faith
and credit would not conclude that traditional tribal courts should receive full faith and credit).
386. See Garonzik, supra note 231, at 763-69 (proposing an amendment to the Full Faith
and Credit Act that would grant tribal court judgments full faith and credit after meeting certain
standards).
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the recognition of tribal judgments in federal courts.3 87 Although most
commentators believe that the court reached the wrong decision in that case,
they have been more supportive of the system the court utilized. 388 In fact,
Professor Robert Laurence suggests that, with one exception, "the case stands
as a fine statement of the application of the principles of comity to our issue.
3 89
For this reason, a comity-based approach is better suited to resolving the
problem of judgment recognition.
The only remaining question is whether the comity approach should
require a consideration of the same factors in all three courts or follow
Professor Laurence's asymmetrical approach.39° Considering the important
differences between tribal courts and nontribal courts, as well as the variety
among the tribal courts themselves, the asymmetrical approach proposed by
Professor Laurence provides the best solution to the judgment recognition
problem.391 Laurence's approach best accomplishes the goals of the Proposal
advocated in this Note because his approach provides maximum flexibility and
protection for tribal sovereignty and culture, while protecting the constitutional
rights of non-Indians.
In sum, the CAIC should recognize the judgments of the tribal courts
under the Ninth Circuit approach, with Professor Laurence's substitution of the
ICRA for the due process requirement.392 If the CAIC enforces the judgment as
a matter of comity, that judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in other
federal and state courts.393 Meanwhile, other federal and state courts must
387. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (providing six exceptions to the general rule of
recognition of tribal court judgments).
388. See Laurence, supra note 382, at 131-32 (arguing that the second holding in Wilson
was wrong after approvingly citing the first holding).
389. Id. at 131 (arguing for a substitution of the ICRA for the court's due process
requirement).
390. See id. at 137-38 (providing several reasons to prefer an asymmetrical approach).
391. See Laurence, supra note 375, at 36 (setting forth the various factors for courts to
consider under his asymmetric view).
392. See Laurence, supra note 382, at 131 ("I would add to the Ninth Circuit's Wilson
analysis explicit reference to the Indian Civil Rights Act, replacing the court's generalized
mention of due process."). Because Laurence proposed his solution under the current system, a
slight modification is necessary. Notably, if the tribal court enters a judgment against a
nonmember, then the due process standard in Wilson should apply, but only the lesser ICRA
requirements should apply to judgments against tribal members. See supra notes 258-59 and
accompanying text (explaining why different standards are allowable for tribal members and
nontribal members).
393. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (providing full faith and credit for
judgments of the CAIC); see also Ransom et al., supra note 166, at 277 (proposing a
"transformer" theory ofjudgment recognition). By going through the CAIC, this proposal fully
implements Chief Justice Ransom's theory, without requiring separate negotiation.
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analyze decisions that do not reach the CAIC utilizing the same approach as the
CAIC.394 Finally, tribal courts would not enforce state and federal judgments
based on the satisfaction of due process; rather, they would examine the
judgment's effect on the tribe to determine whether to grant comity to the
judgment.395
D. Answering Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Solution
While this Proposal attempts to solve many of the problems with the
current system of tribal court jurisdiction, it is not immune from criticism.
Although commentators could raise several arguments in opposition to this
Proposal, this subpart address two of the more obvious criticisms. Namely, it
dismisses the criticisms of potential assimilation and costs of implementation.
1. Assimilation
As with any proposal to incorporate Indian tribes into the federal system,
this Proposal remains open to criticism on assimilationist grounds. Because
this Proposal bases the structure of the tribal court system on state and federal
court models, that criticism is not baseless. This Proposal, however, overcomes
that criticism because of the extensive advances of tribal sovereignty that it
includes. In fact, this Proposal attempts to reconcile the conflicting goals of
maintaining Indian culture and of protecting the rights of non-Indians by
granting concessions to each side at the expense of the other side.
For example, this Proposal greatly expands tribal court jurisdiction,396
while providing a federal appellate court to ensure that the tribal court's
exercise of jurisdiction was just.397 Similarly, each tribe has the option to
acquire even more jurisdiction if it agrees to provide additional constitutional
safeguards.398 While adopting those safeguards would cause the tribe to
become more American, the tribe has the unilateral power to make the decision
394. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (noting the need for uniformity through
the implementation of a federal statute).
395. See Laurence, supra note 375, at 36 (arguing for such a standard because of "the
impact that the off-reservation judgment could have on closely held customs and traditions in
the small tribal community").
396. Supra Part VI.A.
397. See supra notes 343, 349-53 and accompanying text (providing for de novo review of
tribal court jurisdiction in the CAIC).
398. Supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
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for itself, which is hardly an assimilationist view. In addition, Indian tribes
have no obligation to run their appellate court systems the same way that their
state and federal counterparts do,399 and they have the absolute power to
determine their own choice of law procedures. 400 Even the CAIC guarantees at
least half of its positions to Indian judges, who can ensure that it does not
acquire an assimilationist view of tribal issues.40 ' Thus, because of the
immense autonomy granted to the Indian tribes under this Proposal, any
resulting assimilation must come from decisions made by the tribes themselves.
2. Costs of Implementation
In addition to raising concerns over potential assimilation, this Proposal
requires significant funding for proper implementation. First, Congress must
provide a CFR court for every tribe that does not currently have a tribal
court.40 2 Second, Congress must provide the larger tribes with appellate CFR
courts once the tribes operate their own lower tribal courts.40 3 Third, this
Proposal provides for a new federal circuit court of appeals devoted specifically
to the resolution of tribal issues.404  Finally, Congress needs to provide
significant funding increases to allow tribal courts to develop necessary
"accouterments of justice."40 5
While these costs are unavoidable, most of them are not as significant as
they appear at first glance. For instance, many tribes have at least one level of
tribal courts, so they have no need for a new CFR court.406 In addition, CFR
courts are temporary courts, and many tribes will want to create their own
courts to avoid the disadvantages of relying on the CFR courts.4 07 Although the
CAIC is a permanent court that will need continual funding, it will handle all
appeals from the tribal court systems, thereby significantly reducing the burden
399. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (noting that the tribes have the option to
take control of their appellate courts).
400. Supra note 357 and accompanying text.
401. Supra note 319 and accompanying text.
402. Supra Part VI.B.1.
403. Supra Part VI.B.2.
404. Supra Part VI.B.3.
405. Jones, supra note 140, at 476.
406. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406, 54,407 (Oct. 21,
1993) (providing several examples of tribes that operate their own tribal courts); see also 25
C.F.R. § 11.100(a) (2007) (listing the fifteen CFR courts throughout the country).
407. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,406 (declaring the
BIA's policy of encouraging tribes to develop their own court systems).
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on the federal district courts, which currently hear post-exhaustion appeals. 40 8
Similarly, the CAIC will conduct any required judgment recognition analysis
on appeal,4 °9 which will significantly reduce the burden on the state courts. Of
course, the implementation of this proposal still requires significant
expenditures, but recent federal legislation indicates a congressional intent to
provide adequate funding to promote the growth of tribal courts.
410
VII. Conclusion
The existing system of tribal court jurisdiction is overly complex and
produces inconsistent results. Instead of allowing the Supreme Court to
continue to address the problems one factual scenario at a time, Congress, using
its plenary power over Indian affairs, should take charge and implement a
comprehensive statute to firmly establish tribal courts as members of the federal
union. In passing such a statute, Congress should attempt to maximize tribal
sovereignty, while continuing to protect the individual rights of the American
people. Because none of the existing models adequately address these
competing goals, a unique new solution is necessary. Hopefully, the Proposal
set forth in this Note will provide a foundational starting point toward enacting
a comprehensive solution that eliminates most of the problems with the existing
system.
408. See Royster, supra note 125, at 254 (noting the possibility of attacking a tribal court
judgment in federal court).
409. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (providing for judgment recognition
analysis during an appeal to improve efficiency).
410. See Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-559, §§ 201-202, 114 Stat. 2778, 2781-82 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3681 (2000))
(extending the funding provisions of the Indian Tribal Justice Act while providing additional
grants from the attorney general).

